อนุสาวรีย์พิทักษ์รัฐธรรมนูญ: ร้องรอยแห่งความหมายและความทรงจำ
The Constitutional Defense Monument: Vestiges of Meanings and Memories

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บทคัดย่อ
งานวิจัยชิ้นนี้ได้ทำการศึกษาอนุสาวรีย์พิทักษ์รัฐธรรมนูญในเชิงวิพากษ์ผ่านการวิเคราะห์สัญลักษณ์ การสื่อความหมายทางสถาปัตยกรรม ในประเด็นด้านการเป็นสื่อแสดงอิสระจักรวาล และเฉพาะอย่างยิ่งสำหรับคณะรัฐบาลภายใต้การนำของคณะราษฎรระหว่าง พ.ศ. 2475-2490, การเป็นภาพสะท้อนให้เห็นถึงอุดมการณ์ทางการเมืองของชนชั้นนั้นๆ ว่า “ความเป็นชาติไทย” ให้กับพลเมืองและการเป็นเครื่องมือเพื่อแสดงออกถึงเอกลักษณ์ไทย

องค์การวิจัยชิ้นนี้ขึ้นอยู่กับทฤษฎีวิเคราะห์วิพากษ์และการวิเคราะห์สัญลักษณ์ได้เพียงให้เห็นว่า การสื่อความหมายของอนุสาวรีย์พิทักษ์รัฐธรรมนูญนั้นได้ถูกกำหนดขึ้น แก้ไข เปลี่ยนแปลงไป และลบล้าง อันเป็นผลสืบเนื่องจากการยึดจังหวะทางการเมืองภายใต้อัตลักษณ์การต่าง ๆ เช่น ลัทธิชาตินิยมและแนวความคิดแบบประชาธิปไตย ซึ่งในที่สุดได้นำไปสู่การเปลี่ยนแปลงความหมายดังกล่าวไปจากความทรงจำทางประวัติศาสตร์ของผู้คนในยุคปัจจุบันจนถึงปัจจุบันสิ้นสุด

โดยอาศัยการساءงการวิจัยเพื่อเก็บข้อมูลสัญลักษณ์ทางการเมืองผ่านทางสถาปัตยกรรม เนื่องจากทั้งหมดที่กล่าวมาข้างต้นได้ถูกเรียบเรียงและนำเสนอผ่านความสัมพันธ์ในมิติต่าง ๆ อันได้แก่ อนุสาวรีย์...
พิทักษ์รัฐธรรมนูญกับการทำหน้าที่สถาปัตยกรรมที่สนองตอบต่อการแสดงอานาจและความชอบธรรมทางการเมืองให้แก่รัฐ รวมทั้งปัจจัยทางการเมืองซึ่งก่อให้เกิดการเปลี่ยนแปลงความหมายและการลบเลือนความสำคัญของอนุสาวรีย์แห่งนี้ ประกอบกับความเคลื่อนไหวทางสังคมโดยภาคประชาชนที่ส่งผลให้อนุสาวรีย์พิทักษ์รัฐธรรมนูญกลับมาได้รับการจดจ้านในฐานะของพื้นที่แห่งความขัดแย้งและการต่อสู้ทางการเมืองอีกครั้งหนึ่ง

คำสำคัญ : สถาปัตยกรรมสมัยใหม่ในประเทศไทย, การเมืองกับสถาปัตยกรรม, คณะราษฎร, กบฏบวรเดช
Abstracts

This research presents a critical investigation on the Constitutional Defense Monument (Anusaowari Phithak Ratthathammanun) in Bangkok. Via discourse and iconographical analyses, the monument is examined firstly as a means of power meditation for the state, especially between 1932 and 1947 during the People’s Party administration (or the Khana Ratsadon era), secondly as a reflection of the ideological views of the ruling elites on the Thai nationhood, and thirdly as an expression of the Thai identities.

Informed by critical and semiological theories, the inquiries reveal that the symbolic significations of the Constitutional Defense Monument were created, manipulated, transformed, and disregarded by power politics under the ideological pretexts of nationalism and democracy, rendering its original meanings almost forgotten in the present collective memory of Thai citizens.

By utilizing the politics of representations as a mode of problematization, the upcoming critical and analytical discussions initially evolve around the theme of investigating the Constitutional Defense Monument in terms of a representational tool to assert, legitimize, and maintain power. The scholarly foci subsequently shift to explore the ways in which the state had semantically re-appropriated this public structure to pursue their political agenda, leading to changes of meanings and negligence of its significance. Finally, the studies concentrate on the manners in which ordinary citizens had subversively turned the monument into a contested space to practice their social and political activities.

Keywords: Modern Architecture in Thailand, Politics and Architecture, The People’s Party, Boworadet Rebellion
Introduction

Even though located on a historically important site marking the battlefield of the bloody Boworadet Rebellion in 1933, the Constitutional Defense Monument (or Anusaowari Phithak Ratthathammanun) today occupies an obscure position both in the present urban fabric of Bangkok and in the collective Thai psyche. As epistemologically exhibited by a couple of seminal works on the history of modern architecture in Thailand by Vimolsiddhi Horayangkura and Pussadee Tiptus, its insignificance can be witnessed from a number of key academic literatures as well, which largely illustrated the memorial in terms of physical descriptions, formal and stylistic analyses, or excluded it from their canonical lists altogether.

Since the dawn of the new millennium, however, several studies undertaken by Thai and foreign academics had produced valuable contributions to the corpus of knowledge on architecture and urban space in Siam and Thailand. Some had, in fact, provided alternative narratives against the Euro-centric point of view on modern architecture as a deviation of Modernism in the West with adjustments to suit local climates and cultures of Thailand. Fostered by these scholarly developments, Modernist buildings erected by the People’s Party (or Khana Ratsadon) between 1932 and 1947—including the Constitutional Defense Monument—had increasingly become the objects of inquiries, as demonstrated by pioneering studies by Chatri Prakitnondhakarn, Koompong Noobanjong, and Ka F. Wong, coupled with recent master’s theses as well as doctoral dissertations by Pinai Sirikitakul, Lawrence Chua, and Chomchon Fusinpaiboon.

In a corollary view to those contemporary investigations, this research argues that the commission of the Constitutional Defense Monument presented conscious efforts by the People’s Party administrations to assert, legitimize, and maintain their hegemonic power under the guises of political ideologies, namely nationalism and democracy. The novel architectural characteristics together with symbolism and iconography of the
memorial were shaped by—as much shaped—the social, cultural, political, and economic contexts that brought it into existence.

Via discourse and iconographical analyses, the Constitutional Defense Monument is examined for its significative roles, firstly as a means of power meditation for the state, secondly as a material manifestation of the ideological views of the ruling elites on the Thai nationhood, and thirdly as a propagandistic tool to express the Thai identities. Informed by critical and semiological theories, the monument is perceived as a system of signs whose meanings had been interpreted by, as much as become interpretations of, other signs or textual materials. On that basis, the inquiries further disclose that the symbolic significations of the memorial were generated, manipulated, altered, and disregarded by power politics, rendering its original meanings a vague vestige in the current public memory.

The upcoming critical and analytical discussions consist of two thematic foci, using the politics of representations at the Constitutional Defense Monument as a mode of problematization. The first is a political form of architecture and public space, where the memorial functioned primarily as a representational device for power mediation. The second is the architectural and urban forms of politics, illustrating the ways in which the meanings of the monument had been transformed through semantic re-appropriations by both the state and ordinary people.

Theoretical Foundations

By treating architecture as a system of signs, a remark could be made that buildings signified their meanings through representations in the same way as proper names (the signified) stood for the objects denoted by them (the signifier). Because the meanings were given, along with the practices that created them, the uses of stylistic elements presupposed the practices aimed to providejustifications for architectural designs and significations.
For architecture of the state like the Constitutional Defense Monument, the practice of power mediation signified its meanings. In this respect, the symbolism and iconography of the monument became a “discourse” for mediating power. According to Michel Foucault, discourse was a construction of subjectivity within certain historical, social and cultural systems of knowledge in a society. Just as the subject was produced by, and must operate within, the laws of language, a discourse generated a subject equally dependent upon the rules of the system of knowledge that generated it. Discourse was used to legitimate the exercise of power and therefore was always associated with desire, but these links had to be masked if the desire and power were to be manifested.

Kim Dovey maintained that the masking of power in built forms resulted from rapid changes in political situations, requiring swift moves from one method of exercising power to another to conceal itself in the transitional process. The masking of power also derived from the fact that a naked will to power was morally unacceptable. Hence, one’s rise to power must be legitimized and portrayed as the common good of a society, which was normally carried out through an allusion to ideologies. With respect to architectural and urban designs, buildings and public space propagating political contents usually operated under an ideological guise via the creation of identity: a projection of specific characteristics that could mobilize people to come together to express their solidarity and feeling of belonging, which could be politically exploited. Nevertheless, the identification ascribed to an ideology did not present any intrinsic quality of it, but simply represented what it created: a discourse for power mediation. Notwithstanding such complexities, examining the dialogue between architecture, power, identity, and ideology remains crucial to understand the mediation of power by the Constitutional Defense Monument.
The Genesis of the Constitutional Defense Monument

The Constitutional Defense Monument was the second public monument commissioned by the People’s Party, a group founded by foreign-educated military personnel and civil servants who orchestrated a bloodless revolution on June 24, 1932 that ended the age of absolute monarchy in Siam (which became Thailand in 1939). The creation of this memorial was catalyzed by the bloody Boworadet Rebellion during the Photh Phahonyothin administration (1933-1938). On October 11, 1933, Prince Boworadet, an ardent royalist and minor member of the royal family, staged a counter-coup issuing a list of seven demands, including a restoration of the monarchical power in political affairs. The constitutional government turned down the royalists’ ultimatum, sending Plaek Khittasangkha (Phibunsongkhram or Phibun)--head of the junior military faction in the People’s Party--to lead troops in the field. Heavy fighting took tolls on both sides around the area known as Bangkhen Field in Laksi District, a northern suburb in Bangkok near Donmuang Airbase, which subsequently became the site for erecting a memorial.

The carnage lasted until October 23 before it was finally over. Prince Boworadet fled to French Indochina. Although there was no concrete proof that King Rama VII (Prajadhipok, r. 1925-1935)--the country’s first constitutional monarch--supported the mutiny, the outcome was a blow to the sovereign, diminishing his prestige and authority. In the following year, the crown departed to England and abdicated the throne after a falling out with the military. He remained there until his death in 1940. For the next quarter of a century, the monarchy did not play a visible role in Thai society. Key members of the People’s Party took turn to assume administrative positions in a fifteen-year period after 1932.

The military triumph of the constitutional regime in 1933 gave rise to the passage of the Act for the Protection of the Constitution, coupled with a promise of a fully elected national
In order to commemorate their victory, the government organized state funerals at the Royal Field (Sanam Luang)—a large public space located at the heart of Historic Bangkok—on February 17-19, 1934, to honor seventeen government troops who perished from the Boworadet Rebellion despite King Rama VII’s repeated objections. Apart from proclaiming their ideological triumph over the conservative royalists, the People’s Party’s violation of the regal sanctity of Sanam Luang by erecting a temporary crematorium for commoners signified the efforts by the 1932 coup promoters to shape the political landscape of the country.

Still, the People’s Party yearned for something more permanent, so the Phahonyothin administration decided to construct a military memorial and a Buddhist temple. In 1936, the Constitutional Defense Monument—initially named the Rebellion Suppression Monument (Anusaowari Prapkabot) was built. The memorial was accompanied by the commission of a nearby new monastery in 1940 [Figure 1]. Originally called Wat Prachathippatai (the Democracy Temple), it was renamed to Wat Phra Sri Mahathat, Bangkhen, when a special envoy came back from India with a relic of the Buddha to be enshrined in a stupa, together with branches of the sacred Bodhi tree to be planted on the ground of the monastery.
The Ministry of Defense tasked Lieutenant Colonel Luang Naruemitr Laekhakarn (Yuean Bunsen, 1890-1955), a faculty member at the Army’s Cadet School (known today as Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy), to design the Constitutional Defense Monument. Unveiled to the public on October 15, 1936, its construction was entrusted to the newly reorganized Fine Arts Department (FAD). The memorial housed the ashes of the seventeen deceases, including the remains of Major Luang Amnuay Songgram, an army officer who was a member of the 1932-coup promoters and a compadre of Phibun. On that account, another remark could be put forward that Anusaowari Phithak Ratthathammanun functioned both as a military monument and a war memorial at the same time.

The Constitutional Defense Monument as a Political Form of Architecture and Public Space

A Means of Power Meditation

The Constitutional Defense Monument mediated the power of the People’s Party via the following means of representations. First, as indicated by the emblem of the Thai armed forces on its west façade in conjunction with the overall bullet-shaped profile of the memorial [See Figure p. 39], the militaristic origin of the Constitutional Defense Monument provided a source of references in depicting the People’s Party as the country’s socio-political hegemonic force. Likewise, by occupying the battlefield where the royalist troops were defeated, the location of the memorial not only celebrated the military victory of the post-absolutist regime in 1933, but also reaffirmed the political legitimacy and ascendancy of the People’s Party.

Second, the apex of the Democracy Defense Monument featured the dual golden offering bowls (phanwaenfa) supporting an image of the constitution carved in the form of a folded document (samutthai) [See Figure p. 39]. The two sculptural elements portrayed the constitution--and by extension, the People’s Party--as the country’s socio-political hegemonic
authority. The said symbolic meanings originated from a long tradition of the Thais in using the same kind of bowls to present their offerings to the sovereigns. At the Constitutional Defense Monument, the gift to the crown was the folded document of the constitution, which the coup promoters forced King Rama VII to accept it in 1932.29

In effect, the gilded bowls worked in concert with the folded constitutional document as a subversive mechanism in asserting the socio-political predominance of the People’s Party, while contesting, negotiating, and subjugating the monarchy into oblivion. Both sculptural elements conjointly stood for Prajadhipok’s acquiescence to the proletarian request for a constitution, which further implied the supremacy of the constitution over the monarchical institution. At the same time, their combined imagery enabled the coup promoters to depict and legitimize themselves as champions of democracy and guardians of the constitution and the Thai nation.30

Owing to such crucial political implications, the combined image of the dual gilded offering bowls and folded document of the constitution (or phan ratthathammanun) was extensively used by the People’s Party not only as a symbol of the democratic ideology and new age of constitutionalism, but as an emblem of the highest authority—the constitutional charter—binding the modern Thai nation together.31 Being the first to employ the offering bowls and image of the constitutional document, the Constitutional Defense Monument set a precedent for other architecture of the state, works of arts, and even everyday objects created during the era of the People’s Party to emulate.32

Prominent examples could be seen from the Democracy Monument in Bangkok in 1939 and many pavilions at the Constitutional Celebration Fairs (nganchonong ratthathammanun) between 1932 and 1947, coupled with graphic design products, such as a lottery ticket in 1940 and a set of postage stamps in 1943. Even after the end of the People’s Party rule, the same icon had continued to be used, especially for state agencies in
the legislative branch of government, as shown by the emblem of the Secretariat of the House of Representatives today.

Third, under the pretext of paying respect to the democratic ideologies by the virtue of self-sacrifice, the Constitutional Defense Monument was devised as a simplified form of traditional Siamese prang or pagoda, consisting of eight tapering façades but without a pointed spire with an orb at the pinnacle, to enshrine the remains of the seventeen soldiers.33

Sitting on a large traffic roundabout called the Laksi Circle intersecting Phahonyothin Road--Thailand’s first major highway [Figure 1]--the eight facades of the memorial metaphorically disseminated the dominant authority of the People’s Party through the four cardinal plus the four intermediate directions [See Figure p. 39].34

The aforementioned formal appropriation turned the Constitutional Defense Monument into a quasi-religious structure, elevating “the status of the war heroes to the supreme level of religious saint.”35 For their good deeds in defending the nation and democracy, the names and ranks of the perished seventeen servicemen were exhibited on the west side of the memorial. In bestowing a spiritual honor to those martyrs, the Constitutional Defense Monument displayed a Buddhist emblem of dharmachakra (or the wheel of law, representing the teachings of the Buddha) on its north façade as well [See Figure p. 39].

Contemporary sources, however, offered dissimilar interpretations on the utilization of this icon. Some recent studies interpreted that the dharmachakra denoted the peaceful and united Thailand after the Boworadet Rebellion.36 Other investigations suggested that the wheel was indeed employed as a symbolic discourse by the People’s Party to justify their military triumph in 1933 in terms of a rightful defense of the Thai nation, constitution, and democratic ideology, which was morally equivalent to an act of protecting the dharma.37 In this regard, it might be construed that the emblematic reference to the Buddhist wheel of law empowered the People’s Party to establish their righteous places in the
modern history of the nation, aside from depicting the royalist rebels as national enemies.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{A Reflection of Ideological Views on the Thai Nationhood}

A number of inquiries on the arts and architecture of the People’s Party characterized that the Constitutional Defense Monument presented “an illustration of the artistic metamorphosis of Thai nationalistic monuments.”\textsuperscript{39} This claim was substantiated by Phibun’s speech in 1936 (then the Minister of Defense) at the opening ceremony of the memorial.\textsuperscript{40}

The Ministry of Defense, Phibun announced, “dedicated this public monument to the Thai nation.”\textsuperscript{41} He subsequently appealed for political reconciliation by stating that there was “no personal pleasure to witness the construction of the memorial.”\textsuperscript{42} Apart from being a tribute to the seventeen servicemen, the minister concluded, the Constitutional Defense Monument stood for the tragedy of the Boworadet Rebellion that caused death and destruction among Thais, serving as a reminder for Thai citizens to refrain from letting their political differences turning into hostility that would destroy the national unity once again.\textsuperscript{43}

The patriotic and reconciliatory sentiments in Phibun’s speech called for further inquiries into the manners in which nationalism together with the concept of the Thai nationhood were manifested at the Constitutional Defense Monument.

According to the Six Principles of the People’s Party—which were Independence, Security, Economic, Equality, Liberty and Education—the notion of Independence occupied the first order,\textsuperscript{44} indicating that the idea of nation-state and its sovereignty ranked among the top concerns for the 1932-coup promoters. Nonetheless, their visions of the Thai nationhood were diverse, mirroring an internal rift within the group. Divided into two circles roughly identified with the civilian and military members and their respective leaders, Pridi Banomyong and Phibun, the two factions held dissimilar perspectives on the roles and purposes of the state, as well as different views on nationalism.\textsuperscript{45}
Envisioning the nation and constitution as a new focus of public loyalty for Thai citizens, consisting of various ethnic groups, the socialist-oriented Pridi believed in a liberal version of nationalism. On the contrary, the fascist-oriented Phibun advocated a militarized one. Phibun’s faction promoted a strong military leadership to govern a well-ordered society and a civilized nation-state, populated predominantly by the Thai race. In doing so, they modified King Rama VI (Vajiravudh, r. 1910-1925)’s concept of the Thai nationhood--centering on nation, religion (Buddhism), and monarchy--but substituted the
regal institution with the notions of constitutionalism and modern egalitarianism.\(^{47}\)

Despite their ideological dissimilarity, both groups resorted to the value of patriotism, which was signified by an inscription of King Vajiravudh’s poem *Siamanutsati* (the Conscience of Siam) on the east façade of the Constitutional Defense Monument [Figure 3]. This semantic appropriation served as a reference to illustrate the People’s Party’s efforts in promoting political pacification, social reconciliation, and national unity, echoing Phibun’s speech at the inauguration of the memorial in 1936.\(^{48}\)

**An Expression of the Thai Identity**

As explained earlier, semiology lent a theoretical ground to argue that like textual materials and other types of cultural artifacts, public buildings and urban space were not only tangible images of the aspirations of the society that produced them, but they were an attempt to mold social attitudes.\(^{49}\) For the post-absolutist Thailand, it was commonly known that key members the People’s Party were acutely aware of the importance of modern architecture to help construct their self-image as a progressive organization.\(^{50}\) Modernist buildings became objects of their aspiration that were energetic and desirable, representing symbols of pride, progress, and parity with the West, while at the same time proving a “novelty of propaganda for the new government.”\(^{51}\)

In accordance with the Modernist principles of simplicity, massive and voluminous formal and spatial configurations, functional and rational compositions, structural and materialistic expressions, Luang Naruemitr Laekhakarn organized the overall profile of the Constitutional Defense Monument into basic shapes and straight lines to fit the tectonic capability of reinforced concrete in conjunction with minimal use decorative elements.\(^{52}\) Whereas the proportion of the eight *prang*-like façades was shortened, the decorative patterns of stacking rows of lotus leaves were de-curved and simplified, thus becoming more geometric [See Figure p. 39 and Figure 3].
Some contemporary investigations elaborated that the geometrical simplicity coupled with materialistic expressions of the memorial represented two cardinal values of the Six Principles of the People’s Party—Equality and Economic—promulgating the democratic ideology along with the idea of modern egalitarianism in built forms. The use of inexpensive material like reinforced concrete, in particular, became a *media par excellence* to demonstrate a logical and careful management of the country’s economy by The People’s Party, while criticizing extravagant, conspicuous, and irrational spending on luxurious cultural commodities during the royal absolutist period.

In addition, with respect to the concept of modern egalitarianism, the Constitutional Defense Monument was the second public monument commissioned after 1932 that introduced images of ordinary people, as seen from the bronze-relief sculpture on the south side depicting the “ideal citizens.” The relief portrayed an image of a Thai family consisting of a husband, wife, and child. Although they appeared to be farmers, which make up the majority of the Thai population then, their costumes disclosed a sense of socio-cultural sophistication [Figure 3].

Aesthetically akin to the “heroic realism” style widely adopted by many nation-states between the 1930s and 1940s, these commoners represented the notions of Equality and Liberty among the populace. Consequently, the iconography of “the ideal citizens” not only propagated a new Thai identity, but also distinguished the progressive and democratic nation of Thailand from the absolutist kingdom of Siam. With the defeat of the royalist rebels in 1933, the image of the ideal citizens symbolically expressed that Thai people were no longer royal subjects whose fates and livelihoods depended on mercy, preference, and whim of the rulers. They were citizens of a civilized and modern nation-state whose rights and duties were established and equally guaranteed by the constitution, as promulgated by the Six Principles of the People’s Party embedded in their first revolutionary manifesto.
The Constitutional Defense Monument as Architectural and Urban Forms of Political Physical Modification and Reiteration of Symbolic Meanings in Collective Memory

An expansion of open space at the Constitutional Defense Monument took place in 1939, followed by the construction of the neighboring Wat Phra Sri Mahathat, Bangkhen a year later during Phibun’s first premiership (1938-1944).58 Taken as a whole, the expansion of the public ground at the memorial and commission of the temple demonstrated the efforts of the People’s Party in reiterating the shift of power and political legitimacy away from the absolutist regime, aside from celebrating the era of constitutional government.59

At the urban scale, the above politics of representations in the built environment became very discernible, particularly when considering the relationships between the construction of the Constitutional Defense Monument and development of the Bangkhen Field after 1934. Prior to the 1932 revolution, the entire area was turned into paddy rice fields since the reign of King Rama V (Chulalongkorn, r. 1868-1910), thanks to the introduction of irrigational system inaugurated by the creations of Bangkhen and Perm Prachakorn canals.60

Due to the outcome of the Boworadet Rebellion, both the commissions of the Constitutional Defense Monument and Wat Phra Sri Mahathat, Bangkhen denoted a center of everything progressive, by which Phahonyothin Road and Laksi Circle connected, linking the capital city to the upper parts of the country while at the same time expressing the sweeping authority of the People’s Party.61 Named the Democracy Road (Thanon Prachathippatai) at first, the title was switched to Phahonyothin in 1940 to honor the second prime minister. In actuality, however, the construction of this 1,005 km.-long highway bore a strategic importance for the People’s Party administrations.62 Built mostly by the Army Corps of Engineers, Phahonyothin Road was intended from the onset to function
as a new line of communications adding onto existing rail networks for transporting military supplies and reinforcements had another attempt to seize the power of the state by means of a coup d'état similar to the Boworadet Rebellion happened again in future.\textsuperscript{63}

In addition to its symbolism, iconography, and physical modifications, the meanings of the Constitutional Defense Monument--like those of other public memorials--were manifested through public rites, rituals, and ceremonies.\textsuperscript{64} In this respect, the annual commemorative event became an integral part in preserving a collective memory to remind the populace that the battle against Boworadet rebels was conducted by the People’s Party on behalf of their best interests to counter a return of the royalist rule.\textsuperscript{65}

The Ministry of Defense organized the annual commemoration on October 14, marking the day when a decisive battle happened in 1933. Being an amalgamation of a religious ritual, military rite, and civic festivity, the commemoration was regarded as an important public event, especially from 1939 to 1943.\textsuperscript{66} The ceremony began in the afternoon, followed by musical performances and movie shows in the evening, drawing a significant number of spectators to the memorial thus allowing the government to cultivate popularity among people.\textsuperscript{67}

Re-appropriation by the First Phibun Regime

The fact that the annual commemorations at the Constitutional Defense Monument became state affairs during the first Phibun administration (1938-1944) called for further inquiries into the politics of representations at the memorial at that time. Under an ideological cover of nationalism and constitutionalism, Phibun fashioned a militaristic state, focusing on a process of modernization. Seeing military leadership as an apposite model for Thailand during World War II, he assumed the role of a “strong and principled leader to whom the Thai elite had historically turned to arbitrate differences.”\textsuperscript{68} Even before ascending to the premiership, Phibun published articles on
the global crisis in the Ministry of Defense Magazine calling for a strong leader in Thailand, as “an animal herd needs its leader.”

Under the directives of Luang Wichit Wathakan, the chief ideologue and predominant cultural architect who served as the Director General of the Fine Arts Department (FAD) from 1934 to 1942, Phibun’s chauvinistic cult of leadership and fascist-oriented nationalistic vision were popularized by songs, plays, dances, and novels, as well as were institutionalized by public events and state ceremonies. As shown by the annual at the Constitutional Defense Monument in 1941 as an example, the Ministry of Defense extended its invitation to the Prime Minister to attend the event together with the regal representatives.

The commemorative service was presided over by Phibun, who commanded the combined armed forces that defeated the Boworadet Rebellion in 1933. Through this mode of self-ascription, the martial connotation of the Constitutional Defense Monument became a discursive discourse to promote Phibun’s cult of leadership, portraying him as a savior of the Thai nation. As a matter of fact, it was widely recognized that Phibun was an admirer of European dictators of the same age, namely Mussolini and Hitler, notably the ways in which *il Duce* and *der Führer* transformed their nations through architectural and urban designs. Apart from commissioning several new public monuments and civic structures, the Thai premier push forward for a legislation of the Act of National Monument Protection, which encompassed the rules and regulations for maintenance and protection of the Constitutional Defense Monument. Yet, the enactment process was eventually shelved after Phibun resigned from the post of the prime minister in 1944.

**Waning Recognition in Public Recollection**

Within less than two decades since the fall of the absolutist rule, the People’s Party regime met its demise after a long and bitter vying for political domination between the military and
civilian factions that resulted in an exile of Pridi in 1947. Although the armed forces brought Phibun back to the premiership by in 1948, he was ousted from power again nine years later.

The coup d’état that brought down Phibun in 1957 proved to be another crucial turning point in modern Thai history, since it bolstered the return of royalist advocates in national politics occasioned by the internal rift in the People’s Party that started during World War II. Up to the mid-1970s, Thailand was mostly governed by a series of military dictators, beset with coups and counter-coups. Espousing orderliness, cleanliness, and conformity, the junta leaders--Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat (1959-1963) and Thanom Kittikachorn (1963-1973)--were traditionalists. The nationalist ethos of these locally educated strongmen embraced Vajiavudh’s concept of Thai nationhood--and by extension, the Thai identity--consisting of the triple values of nation, religion, and monarchy, in place of exogenic and intangible ideas like constitutionalism and democracy, as promulgated by the People’s Party.

Politically, Sarit utilized the monarchical institution as both the focus of loyalty for the citizens and the source of legitimacy for maintaining his regime of “despotic paternalism.” He resuscitated the role of the king along with many ancient Hindu-Buddhist royal customs, while enacting the lèse-majesté law. Sarit revived royal ceremonies and maintaining a very public bond of allegiance to the monarch and the royal family. The restoration of the monarchy elevated the incumbent monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX, r. 1946-Present), to an omnipotent and sacrosanct status.

In contrast to the regal reinstatement, Sarit and his royalist collaborators portrayed the People’s Party and its members as anti-monarchist and hence “un-Thai.” In their collective efforts to negate the political legitimacy of the 1932 coup promoters, the People’s Party was depicted as a group of inept intelligentsias who prematurely brought democracy to Thailand. By the same token, the arts and architecture sponsored by the People’s Party were criticized by several
influential royalist advocates--such as Kukrit Pramoj, a conservative scholar and a royal descent prime minister (1975-1976)--as the most degraded form of aesthetics. As for the Constitutional Defense Monument, a couple textual examples displayed a similar vein of critical reinterpretations. In 1949, Chamlong Ittharong wrote that the monument was a material embodiment for the losses of lives during the early years of the post-absolutist period. The enshrinement of human remains at this public structure comprising exclusively of those of the victors, he went on, would result in animosity from the vanquished for further revenge. In combination with its name as the Rebellion Suppression Monument (Anusaowari Prapkabot), the memorial was indeed a disgrace to the dignity of Thailand because it stood for a sad chapter in the modern history of the nation when Thais slaughtered each other in 1933.

Lui Khiriwat offered a more disapproving assessment in 1950. He charged that the Constitutional Defense Monument was the first and only public memorial in the country that was built without any underlying principle or logical explanation. Its creation, he contended, derived from the desire of the arrogant 1932 coup promoters to monumentalize their killing of members of the armed forces and those who held different political views from them. Lui pointed out that unlike other public memorials, the representational contents of the Constitutional Defense Monument did not comply with the triad values of the Thai nationhood. In contrast, by signifying hostility among Thais, the memorial became a public shrine for which nobody voluntarily paid his/her respect, except those servicemen who were forced to do so once a year.

In sum, after the fall of the People’s Party from power, architecture of the state along with other cultural artifacts commissioned by the government between 1932 and 1947 faded into symbolic obscurity. Under the authoritative umbrella of the royal-nation historiography, the original significations of these built forms either become a vague vestige in public memory, or reinterpreted in a comparable manner to Chamlong and Lui’s
appraisals of the Constitutional Defense Monument. Even after the end of the junta regime in the mid-1970s, such negative renditions had continued to stigmatize the memorial until the present day.

**Physical Alterations**

Since the 1970s, the royalists were able to re-establish the regal authority as the supreme socio-political arbitrative force. The most telling evidence, perhaps, could be witnessed from King Rama IX’s interventions during the student’s uprising in 1973 and the urban bourgeoisie’s revolt in 1991 against military dictators twice averted the prospects of a civil war in Thailand. Nonetheless, the crown and the royal family distanced themselves from the atrocious massacre of students and left-wing social activists on October 6, 1976 at Thammasat University in Bangkok.

Realizing the stain of silence, the government initiated public relation campaigns to salvage the image of the regal authority, and to negate the legacy of the youth revolution. These objectives were accomplished by several measures, e.g., revising school textbooks, as well as popularizing patriotic songs, plays, and literature. They were strengthened by a depiction of the sovereign by mass media as the “father of the nation,” working tirelessly through his networks of charitable foundations and social organizations for the betterment of his subjects.

In his polemical essays, Chatri Prakitnondhakarn convincingly illustrated that the aforementioned public relation campaigns worked hand in hand with the endeavors by royalist advocates to erase the legacy of the People’s Party from public memory. Notable examples could be seen from the demolitions of several structures commissioned by Khana Ratsadon in Bangkok—i.e., Chaloemthai Theater in 1989 and the Supreme Court Building in 2012—coupled with a series of physical alterations at the Constitutional Defense Monument.

In order to relieve traffic problems in the northern Bangkok area, the Department of Highways (DOH) transformed the Laski Circle to an intersection in 1993. With its large open
space obliterated and replaced by traffic lanes, the Constitutional Defense Monument was seriously deprived of its representational ability, as the pedestrian access was taken away.

In spite of such a drastic undertaking, the traffic situation did not improve, whereas heavy traffic became a common sight at the intersection. In 2005, the DOH decided to build a tunnel along Phahonyothin Road. Prior to the construction, the memorial was disassembled and rebuilt on a new spot, situated away from the center of the intersection, which was converted to a traffic roundabout for a second time. These modifications occurred without a comprehensive collaboration among all of the state agencies involved—namely the DOH, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), and Fine Arts Department (FAD)—to preserve the monument, resulting in a barren landscape that further incapacitated its symbolic signification.82

Even after the tunnel became operational, traffic congestion within and around the Lakṣi area continued to deteriorate. In 2011, construction works to erect a massive vehicular bridge passing almost on top of the Constitutional Defense Monument began. Thirty months later, the project was completed [Figure 5]. Once again, irrespective of oppositions from some concerned citizens, academics, and professionals, including an objection from the FAD’s Director of Archaeology Office to move the monument to make way for the flyover,83 the memorial was taken apart and reconstructed 50 meters away from its previous location.84

In mid-2010, an official from the DOH clarified that the agency always organized public hearings and secured permissions from the FAD before relocating and rebuilding the monument. Albeit being registered as a historical site, this public structure was not listed as an archaeological site. So, there was no legal problem in the way of its removal.85 The Director of the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning at the Ministry of Transportation offered a bolder justification, saying that the reposition of the Constitutional Defense Monument should not be seen as a disturbing trouble by the general public. The memorial was not a religious
structure, but merely a representation of political ideology in a built form.\textsuperscript{86}

Revival and Re-appropriation of the Original Meanings via Discursive Practice

Standing now in an obscure spot, the representational ability of the Constitutional Defense Monument is close to nil.\textsuperscript{87} Nevertheless, at the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the original meaning of the memorial been revived and re-appropriated by members of the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD)--or the Red Shirts. In 2010, the monument was utilized by UDD protesters as a staging area for organizing political rallies against the military-installed Abhisit Vejjajiva government (2008-2011), culminating in urban riots in Bangkok that ended in tragic losses of 91 deaths and 1,378 injuries.\textsuperscript{88}

The UDD political movement first appeared in 2006 to oppose a coup d’\textsuperscript{\textit{état}} that deposed the popularly elected but very controversial and corrupted Thaksin Shinawatra administration (2001-2006).\textsuperscript{89} During their demonstration on March 12, 2010, the Red Shirts adorned the Constitutional Defense Monument with the national colors, red flags (the Thai national flag comprises red, white, and blue strips), Buddhist emblems, pictures of the royal family, together with patriotic and democratic banners. The proletariat genesis in combination with iconography and symbolism of the memorial also enabled the leaders of the Red Shirts to assert that their protests were intended to advance the cause of the 1932 revolution.\textsuperscript{90}

Through the above representational means, the UDD’s allusions to the democratic ideology and the People’s Party turned the Constitutional Defense Monument into a kind of a contested space symbolizing the Thais’ struggle for democracy and self-empowerment. As demonstrated by their political rhetoric, the Red Shirt leaders embraced the Six Principles of the People’s Party. Core members of the UDD frequently cited the notions of Independence, Security, Economic, Equality, Liberty and Education in their speeches. By ideologically associating
themselves with People’s Party, the Red Shirts gained sympathy from people who opposed the 2006 coup and its ramifications but were not political allies of Thaksin as well.⁹¹

In spite of the UDD’s discursive efforts, the significations of the memorial could still not be fully awaked in the present collective memory to recollect the past. Both the historical and political importance of the Constitutional Defense Monument seemed to firmly register neither with the state authorities nor public perception at large. On the contrary, due to the recent and upcoming construction projects at the Laksi Circle area, the original meaning of the memorial had continued to be largely ignored. In 2012, the Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) unveiled a plan to erect gigantic elevated structures to accommodate two overlapping passenger stations and their associated rail-based mass transit systems, whose sizes and locations could make the memorial becomes even more unrecognizable [Figure 4].⁹²

The said miserable and undignified fate of the Constitutional Defense Monument had raised the following fundamental questions from some contemporary scholars, regarding the politics of representations in built forms in the present Thailand.⁹³ Could a similar physical modification be imposed on any royal monument to alleviate Bangkok’s traffic jams? If not, why?

Figure 4. A computer rendition of the proposed BTS extension Project.

Conclusion

The preceding critical and analytical investigations essentially disclosed that the original signification of the Constitutional Defense Monument was generated, manipulated, altered, and disregarded by power politics. Even though nearly forgotten from the present collective Thai psyche, the meaning of the monument--as a mark of the military triumph of the constitutional regime led by the People’s Party over the royalist Boworadet Rebellion--was revived by a discursive practice of symbolic re-appropriations by the UDD in 2010.

In a nutshell, the inquiries on the politics of representations at the Constitutional Defense Monument revealed that the memorial signified a certain meaning as intended by its creator, as well as contained various interpretations as shown by critical and negative appraisals of the memorial after 1947. Aside from mediating and legitimizing the authority of the People’s Party, the Constitutional Defense Monument acted as a material manifestation of the 1932 coup promoters’ endeavors to define public space, to create public memory and shared mentality, to reflect their ideological views on the Thai nationhood, to express the Thai identity, and to commemorate the trauma from the losses of lives in 1933. Following the political demise of the People’s Party, however, the very same public structure had been characterized by royalist advocates not only as a symbol of misguided nationalism and ill-prepared democracy, but also a relic of a discredited and defunct regime.

Taken together, these changes further indicated that, similar to language, architecture of the state in Thailand had been in a perpetual evolution. Their significations had been caught between the polarities of a conservative force tending to preserve the existing meanings and a revolutionary force striving for the rise of new meanings. Whereas the conservative force led to stability of meanings and institutionalization of forms, its revolutionary counterpart replaced old meanings and forms with new ones. The forms remained the same, but the meanings were
in flux. Both the creations and significations of architecture and urban space in Thailand thus involved the ebbs and flows of life rather than the stabilization of identities and/or conditions.

Finally, as an ending note, at the time of this writing in mid-August 2016, Thai people have found themselves governed by a military regime for the second time since 2006, when the Yingluck Shinawatra administration (2011-2014) was removed from office by another coup d’état in 2014. The latest take over by the armed forces was an outcome from a decade-long political conflict that has bitterly polarized the nation. Notwithstanding the constitutional referendum on August 7, 2016, the current situations in Thailand under the oppressive rule of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) are still unsettled and could become socially explosive. Once again, not only is the future of the Thai nationhood hanging in balance, but also that of the Thai democracy. Hence, how the upcoming developments would affect the politics of representations at the Constitutional Defense Monument remains to be seen.
Anusaowari Phithak Ratthathammanun (the Constitutional Defense Monument) was called by different names, i.e., Anusaowari Prapkabot (the Rebellion Suppression Monument), Anusaori Sipchet Thahanlaetamuat (Memorial of the Seventeen Soldiers and Policemen), Anusaori Luang Amnuaisongkhram (Luang Amnuaisongkhram’s Memorial), or simply Anusaori Laksi (Laksi Monument). Sarunyou Thepsongkraow, “Anusaowari Prapkabot Kapkanramuekwirachon Phuphithakkanpatiwat 2475 [The Rebellion Suppression and a Recollection for the Defenders of the 1932 Revolution],” Silpawatthanatham 34, 12 (2013) : 113-114.


4 According to the convention, whereas a “monument” referred to a structure, statue, or a building commissioned to honor someone notable or a special event, a “memorial” denoted a structure or a statue erected to remember a dead person or a group of people who died in an important past event. Although the author recognized such a difference in architectural significations, the two terms were used interchangeably in this research. Because Anusaowari Phithak Ratthathammanun was constructed to commemorate the victory of the People’s Party government in crushing the Boworadet Rebellion in 1933 and to honor the fallen seventeen government troops who perished from the incident, it essentially operated in both the capacities of a military monument and a war memorial. See : Phibun Hatthakitkoson, “Anusaowari Thai : Kansueksa Naichoengkanmueang [Thai Monument : A Political Study]” (Master Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 1984), 73.

5 In this research, “Thailand” signified the democratic nation after the 1932 revolution, despite the fact that the constitutional government continued to use “Siam” until 1939. The term “Siam” employed here then referred to the country before 1932 during the royal absolutist period.


13 According to philosopher Jürgen Habermas, critical theory contained two overlapping academic disciplines. In sociology and political philosophy, “critical theory” (or “social critical theory”) described a form of self-reflective knowledge and assessment of society and culture, involving both understanding and theoretical explanations that aimed to liberate human subjugation to systems of domination or dependence. In literary studies and literary theory, the term (also called “literary critical theory”) referred to a system of knowledge via interpretations to understand the meanings of human texts and symbolic expressions, thus associating with the field of semiotics (or studies of signs). See: Jürgen Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse [Knowledge and Human Interests]*, trans. J. Shapiro (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972).

14 Because critical theory, on the one hand, sought to engage in reflexive assessments and critiques of society and culture—including the productions and consumptions of cultural products such as architecture and languages—it provided a theoretical ground for this research to look into the Constitutional Defense Monument through its relationships with the social, political, and cultural contexts.

On the other hand, the philosophical connection between critical and semiological theories offered a conceptual framework to examine the linguistic principles by which the memorial obtained, transformed, relinquished and regenerated its symbolic meanings.


22 “Baibanthuek rueangraingan Ruenang thonggathakhuang Kankhopharonmarachanuayat Plongsophahan thithongsanamluang [Reports on King Prajadhipok’s Objection to Grant the Royal Permission for the Cremation of the Soldiers at the Royal Field],” 5 January 1934, The Prime Minister’s Office, Sor. Ror. 0201.26/6, The National Archives of Thailand; “Chotmai Ratmontriwakan Krathonwongwan Riannaikratmotri Wan thi 6 Mokkarakhom Por. Sor. 2486 [Letter from the Minister of the Royal Household to the Prime Minister],” 6 January 1934, The Prime Minister’s Office, Sor. Ror. 0201.26/6, The National Archives of Thailand.
25 By appropriating the formal composition of a traditional Siamese prang and housing the remains of the deceased soldiers, the Constitutional Defense Monument followed King Rama VI’s architectural precedent in combining a Buddhist shrine with the idea of militarism (and by extension, nationalism), as evident from the Monument of the First World War built in 1918. See: Ka F. Wong, *Visions of a Nation: Public Monuments in Twentieth-Century Thailand*, 52.
28 Ibid, 73.
29 Ibid.
33 By appropriating the formal composition of a traditional Siamese prang and housing the remains of the deceased soldiers, the Constitutional Defense Monument followed King Rama VI’s architectural precedent in combining a Buddhist shrine with the idea of militarism (and by extension, nationalism), as evident from the Monument of the First World War built in 1918. See: Ka F. Wong, *Visions of a Nation: Public Monuments in Twentieth-Century Thailand*, 52.
38 Sarunyou Thepsongkraow, “Anusaowari Prapkabot Kapkanramluekwirachon Phuphithakkanpatiwat 2475 [The Rebellion Suppression and a Recollection for the Defenders of the 1932 Revolution],” 120.


40 The opening ceremony of the Constitutional Defense Monument was a major state affair in 1936, presided over by King Rama VIII’s (Ananda Mahidol, r. 1935-1946) representatives. After Buddhist services at the Ministry of Defense in the afternoon of October 14 and in the morning of the next day, the remains of the soldiers were transported via an armored convoyed, escorted by battalions of guards of honor to the memorial site. Contained in artillery shells, the ashes were enshrined inside the monument in the afternoon of October 15, 1936. Following a Buddhist and military burial rites, the ceremony concluded with a flyby of fighter planes from the air force. In the evening, musical and theatrical performances were also organized to commemorate the occasion. See: Prachachat, 17 October 1936, 5; Sarunyou Thepsongkraow, “Anusaowari Prapkabot Kapkanramluekwirachon Phuphithakkanpatiwat 2475 [The Rebellion Suppression and a Recollection for the Defenders of the 1932 Revolution],” Silpawatthanatham 34, 12 (2013) : 118.

41 “Rueangsarang Anusaor Prapkabot Laksi [Constructing the Rebellion Suppression Monument Laksi],” 19 January 1933-6 November 1943, The Secretariat of the Cabinet, (2) Sor. Ror. 3.37/1, The National Archives of Thailand.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.


46 Ibid., 128.

47 Ibid., 137.

48 “Rueangsarang Anusaor Prapkabot Laksi [Constructing the Rebellion Suppression Monument Laksi],” 19 January 1933-6 November 1943, The Secretariat of the Cabinet, (2) Sor. Ror. 3.37/1, The National Archives of Thailand.


50 Nonetheless, a caution must be heeded as well. The connection between modern architecture and ideologies—especially nationalism—was neither unique to Siam before 1932, nor post-absolutist Thailand. Such a practice was indeed a global phenomenon, due to the popularity of Modernism during that time. Between the 1920s and 1940s, Modernist design principles and elements were widely adopted for architecture of the state by governments around the world, ranging from the Italian fascist, British colonialist, to American capitalist and Russian communist rules. Regardless of their ideological diversity, those regimes shared one peculiarity that served as a framework of references for Modernist structures, the notion of nationalism albeit operating under dissimilar definitions.


Also see: Chatri Prakitnondhakarn, *Kanmuenglaesangkhom Naisilpasathapattayakam Sayamsamai Thaiprayuk Chatiniyom [Politics and Society in Architecture: Siamese Era, Applications in Thai Designs, and Nationalism]*, 311. In fact, the said stylistic identification with ideology became obvious, especially when comparing the Constitutional Defense Monument with another war memorial, the Monument of the First World War (Anusaori Thahanasa), built earlier in 1918 during the absolutist reign of King Rama IV (Vajiravudh, r. 1910-1925). Dictated by Vajiravudh’s personal taste, the design of the Monument of the First World War stemmed from traditional Srivijaya Buddhist chedi or stupa. Although both structures enshrined the ashes of the deceased soldiers, the Monument of the First World War contained elegant carving details on its façades, presenting a stark contrast to the minimal surface embellishment of the Constitutional Defense Monument. Ka F. Wong, *Visions of a Nation: Public Monuments in Twentieth-Century Thailand* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2006), 52.

The first was the Monument of Thao Suranari at Nakhon Ratchasima province, commissioned in 1934. Ibid., 108.

Historically, Siamese monarchs institutionalized a code of cultural consumption (*thananusak*) indicating a person’s social status. Derived from the Indian caste system, certain ranks in the socio-political hierarchy were entitled to specific designs of cultural artifacts, e.g. architecture, costume, language, and custom, while particular qualities were reserved for the monarchy. For instance, a nine-tiered parasol was reserved exclusively for a king. Violating the codes amounted to committing a high crime on the *lése majesté* charge. After the 1932, the People’s Party abolished this code along with other royal-related practices, customs, and traditions, deemed as obstacles in promoting socio-political equality among Thai citizens. Also see: Chatri Prakitnondhakarn, *Silpasathapattayakam Khana Ratsadon: Sanyalaksathanrangkanmueang Naichoengutmakan* [The People’s Party’s Art and Architecture: Ideological and Political Symbolism] (Bangkok: Matichon, 2009), 10-11.


“Rueangthidinsamrapkhayai Anusaowari Tambonlaksi [Land Acquisition for Expanding the Monument at Laksi Sub-distric],” 19 December 1939-9 September 1943, The Secretariat of the Cabinet, (2) Sor. Ror. 3.19/1, The National Archives of Thailand.


“Phrarat chabanyat Waduaikanchatsuethidin Lae Asançharimtharapayanguen Phueakayailae Tatthanonchueamkhomnakhom Krungthepphramah anakhonkapdonmuang Laephetaeang Anutsaori Thahanprapkabot Phuthasakkarat 2486 [The Act of Land Acquisitions and Other Kinds of Real Estates to Enlarge the Road linking Bangkok and Donmuang and to Construct the Rebellion Suppression Monument 1934],” The Royal Thai Government Gazette Vol. 50 (11 February 1934) : 951.

“Rueangthidinsamrapkhayai Anusaowari Tambonlaksi [Land Acquisition for Expanding the Monument at Laksi Sub-distric],” 19 December 1939-9 September 1943, The Secretariat of the Cabinet, (2) Sor. Ror. 3.19.1/23, The National Archives of Thailand;

“Rueangsaarang Anusaori Prapkabot Laksi [Constructing the Rebellion Suppression Monument Laksi],” 19 January 1933-6 November 1943, The Secretariat of the Cabinet, (2) Sor. Ror. 3.37/1, The National Archives of Thailand.


Attended by high-ranking officials, commanders of the armed forces, and royal representatives, the activities started in the afternoon with a Buddhist ritual of merit making for the seventeen deceased servicemen performed by an equal number of monks, followed by a military ceremony.

“Rueang Wanthiraluek Thahanlaetamruat Anusaowari Laksi” [The Day of Commemoration for the Fallen Soldiers and Policemen at Laksi Monument],” 8 October 1939–12 October 1943, The Prime Minister’s Office, Sor. Ror. 0201.97.5/3, The National Archives of Thailand.


Chamlong Ittharong, Lakhonkanmueang [Political Drama] (Bangkok : Sahaupakorn Printing, 1949), 322-324.


89 Motivated by the UDD leaders’ promises to restore true democracy by eliminating social injustice and political disenfranchisement, the Red Shirt supporters were mainly liberal academics and activists, coupled with rural people and the urban poor, especially the northerners and northeasterners who benefited from Thaksin’s populist policies in relieving their poverty and promoting socio-economic advancement. Also see: Nirmal Ghosh, “Clash of the Thai-tans,” Straits Times, 2 September 2008 [Online], accessed 7 May 2010. Available from http://blogs.straitstimes.com/2008/9/2/clash-of-the-thai-tans/


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