



ทฤษฎีระบบราชการและความเป็นจริง

สุวิชา เป้าอารีย์

คณะพัฒนาศักยภาพและสิ่งแวดล้อม สถาบันบัณฑิตพัฒนบริหารศาสตร์

บทคัดย่อ

ระบบราชการในกรอบแนวคิดของนักสังคมวิทยาชาวเยอรมัน Max Weber หมายถึงรูปแบบที่สมเหตุสมผลขององค์การขนาดใหญ่และสลับซับซ้อนแต่สามารถที่จะสร้างประสิทธิภาพและประสิทธิผลในการบริหารโดยเกิดขึ้นจากลักษณะเฉพาะของระบบราชการนั้นคือ (1) การมีหน้าที่ประจำของบุคลากรที่เกิดจากการแบ่งงานกันทำ (2) หลักการบังคับบัญชาตามลำดับชั้น (3) การทำงานภายใต้กฎระเบียบที่เคร่งครัด ชัดเจน (4) การปราศจากอคติหรือลำเอียง (5) ข้าราชการถือว่าเป็นอาชีพภายใต้ระบบคุณธรรม (6) ระบบการทำงานที่มีประสิทธิภาพสูงสุด อย่างไรก็ตามในความเป็นจริงดูเหมือนว่าระบบราชการจะไม่เหมาะสมกับสังคมปัจจุบันที่เต็มไปด้วยข้อมูลข่าวสารและเข้าถึงได้ง่าย ในขณะที่ประชาชนส่วนใหญ่เริ่มคุ้นเคยกับการได้รับสินค้าและบริการที่มีคุณภาพสูงและทางเลือกที่มากมาย ด้วยเหตุนี้เองระบบราชการจึงถูกวิพากษ์วิจารณ์ว่าเป็นระบบที่ไม่ยืดหยุ่น ไม่ตอบสนองต่อประชาชน ไม่มีความเป็นระเบียบ มีแนวโน้มกระทำความผิดพลาดอยู่เสมอ การทำงานที่ล่าช้าหลายขั้นตอน บุคลากรไม่ใส่ใจในงาน บริหารผิดพลาดบ่อย ขาดการนำสิ่งใหม่หรือนวัตกรรมเข้ามาใช้ ระบบราชการเข้าถึงได้ยาก บุคลากรในระบบราชการมีลักษณะเย่อหยิ่ง ขาดอารมณ์ขัน ไม่เข้าถึงประชาชน ไม่มีความซื่อสัตย์ ชอบเพิกเฉยต่อปัญหา ภายในองค์การเต็มไปด้วยความขัดแย้งและการแข่งขัน ผู้บริหารไม่ไว้วางใจผู้ใต้บังคับบัญชาทำให้ขาดการกระจายอำนาจจนทำให้ผู้บริหารมีภาระมากจนล้นมือ นอกเหนือจากนั้นแล้วระบบราชการถูกมองว่าไม่สามารถไปด้วยกันได้กับระบอบประชาธิปไตย โดยมีการสร้างความสับสนวุ่นวายและปัญหาให้ซึ่งกันและกัน อย่างไรก็ตามถึงแม้ว่าระบบราชการจะมีลักษณะที่ไม่เป็นที่น่าชื่นชมมากมาย แต่ระบบราชการก็เป็นกลไกที่สำคัญในการบริหารจัดการสาธารณะ ด้วยเหตุนี้เองเพื่อให้ระบบราชการดำเนินต่อไปได้ จึงต้องมีการปฏิรูป แต่ไม่ใช่การปฏิรูประบบอย่างที่ผ่านมา แต่เป็นการปฏิรูปจิตวิญญาณของข้าราชการให้มีความเหมาะสมกับสถานการณ์ปัจจุบัน แต่อย่างไรก็ตามความสำเร็จของการปฏิรูประบบราชการจะเกิดขึ้นได้ก็ต่อเมื่อระบบการเมืองมีผู้นำและนักการเมืองที่ฉลาด มีความสามารถและซื่อสัตย์ ซึ่งอาจเป็นไปได้ว่าระบบการเมืองต้องได้รับการปฏิรูปก่อน ระบบราชการจึงจะสามารถปฏิรูปได้และมีประสิทธิภาพเป็นไปดังกรอบแนวคิดของ Max Weber

คำสำคัญ: ระบบราชการ, ข้าราชการ, การบริการประชาชน, ระบอบประชาธิปไตย



Bureaucracy in Theory and Reality

Suvicha Pouaree

The Graduate School of Social and Environmental Development, National Institute of Development Administration

Abstract

Bureaucracy in the Weberian framework is a rational form of large and complex organization that is able to create effectiveness and efficiency for its administration. Efficient administration derives from characteristics of bureaucracy which are: fixed regular activities as official duties; the principle of hierarchy; governing by a consistent system of abstract rule; a spirit of formalistic impersonality; a career position in a merit system; and a highest degree of efficiency. However, in reality, bureaucratic model is not applicable in modern society where information is easily accessed, and people are accustomed to high-quality goods and services and extensive choice. For example, bureaucracy is criticized as inflexible, unresponsive, disorganized, error-prone, full of red-tape, uncaring, mismanaged, lacking in innovation, inaccessible, arrogant, humorless, out of touch with the public, dishonest, ignorant, full of internal conflict and competition, distrusting of employees, and top heavy. In addition, bureaucracy is viewed as not entirely consistent with democracy. Bureaucracy creates a dilemma for democracy and, on the other hand, democracy creates a dilemma for bureaucracy. However, although there are many negative attributes of a bureaucratic system, bureaucracy is a necessary mechanism in public administration. Therefore, there is a need to reform bureaucracy. But this time, the bureaucratic system itself is not the focus of reform but instead the spirit of bureaucrats needs to be restructured. But reform will only be achieved if it is associated with wise, capable, and honest political leaders -- which might be a prerequisite of bureaucratic reform.

Key words: Bureaucracy, Bureaucrat, Public Service, Democracy

I. Important of Bureaucracy

The goals of modern public administration are the honest, economical provision of public services and the efficient administration of a national and local government. Actions in pursuit of these goals are carried out by bureaucrats who are accountable to elected representatives at the center of government. Whether or not public services are effectively delivery to the citizen depends on the ability of these bureaucrats.

Throughout history, bureaucracy has contributed to the development of modern societies by facilitating the efficient execution of complex tasks and by providing public good. Hence, the study of the nature of bureaucratic organization is essential to ensure effective and efficient distribution of goods and services to the public.

A second reason for studying bureaucracy is that since bureaucracy has become a dominant institution in modern society, it is essential to understand how bureaucracy functions in order to protect ourselves against the threat of bureaucratic domination while continuing to take advantage of the efficiency of bureaucracy (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 13).

In studying the political process, we see that not only are voters, the legislature, political parties, the cabinet, and various pressure groups significant factors in the formation of public policy, but the nature of the bureaucracy itself has also become a primary force which influences government policy-making. Because the basic resource upon which administrative power depends is a body of knowledge necessary to both making decisions in vital areas of policy as well as the ability to mobilize an influential constituency, both technical and political skill is useful in generating bureaucratic power. An agency's ability to exert influence on the policy process can also be traced to the spirit, or vitality of the organization and how effectively it is led (Rourke, 1984: 125). The final and foremost reason to study bureaucracy is to identify the present problems plaguing bureaucracy and to seek solutions to these problems.

As theory is a necessary part of every science, the next part of our discussion will begin with a review of bureaucratic theory, particularly the classical theory of bureaucracy proposed by German social scientist Max Weber. Other modern views of bureaucracy will also be talked about in this part. The third part will focus on the reality of a bureaucratic system including its relationship with society and democracy. In conclusion, the article argues that in order to make a well functioning bureaucracy, public services accountability, the reformed spirit of bureaucrats accompanied with wise, capable, and honest political leaders are musts.

II. Bureaucratic Theory

There is no agreed-upon definition for the word "bureaucracy". It might be defined as a system of rules, a mode of conduct, efficiency or inefficiency, or a social group (Page, 1992: 5-11). Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the definition of

bureaucracy included administration by trained professionals not just of government but of all large organizations. In the Weberian framework, bureaucracy is the most rational form of organization, technically superior to all other forms. Although Weber's explanation of the bureaucratic principle is criticized as an incomplete account of how organization actually operate, Weber's contribution to the model of bureaucracy is recognized and respected among scholars and readers in public administration.

The primary characteristic of the bureaucratic structure, according to Weber, is the regular activities of the organization which are distributed in a fixed way as official duties. The clear-cut division of labor makes it possible to employ only specialized experts in each particular position and to make every one of them responsible for the effective performance of his duties (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 19). All organizational members are selected on the basis of technical qualifications through formal examinations or by virtue of training or education. The demand for specialization has resulted in professionalism among public officials. Consequently, the fundamental source of power for bureaucratic organizations is the expertise they command. Other than the possession of expert knowledge, bureaucrats hold several sources of bureaucratic influence (Thomas 2010 quoted in Craft, 2011: 37):

- Professional background and relative permanence of senior public servants compared with ministers and other parliamentarians;
- The ongoing relationship between the public service and pressure groups, which represent a source of ideas and legitimacy for their policy advice to ministers;
- The role of public servants in the important field of intergovernmental negotiations, which obliges government to grant them autonomy to bargain over policy and its implementations;
- There are limits of parliament's own policy-making capabilities because of the partisan theatrics that govern its proceedings and its reliance on vague policy in legislation, with the details to be provided by the bureaucracy through delegated legislative authority.

Moreover, such bureaucratic expertise is however essential to the effective operation of any modern political system. Political leaders are assisted in their decision-making by experts who provide competent technical advice, and their decisions are carried out by skilled personnel. For the policy process, the skill of

public officials is essential for both making and implementing public policy because the continuity of government work is often maintained and sometimes taken over by the experts in a bureaucracy, not by politicians whose power is not permanent. In the meantime, public servants may point out difficulties in government proposals which political leaders prefer not to hear but which they ought to listen to if they wish to avoid unwelcome consequences (Mulgan, 2008: 346).

The second characteristic of bureaucracy is the principle of hierarchy. Each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one. Every official in this administrative hierarchy is accountable to her superior for her subordinates' decisions and actions as well as her own (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 19). Any actions that attempt to extend the power of control over subordinates beyond the limits according to their lines of command will be judged as an illegitimate exercise of bureaucratic authority. Moreover, bureaucratic power is concentrated at the top administrative level and those at the top have an obligation not only to command but also to coordinate the activities of their subordinates in order to facilitate central planning and to ensure subordinates' discipline. One of the most important factors in the bureaucratic hierarchy is bureaucratic authority because the permanence and power of bureaucracy rest partly on bureaucratic authority (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 62). But it is not wealth or power or heredity that is the main source of authority. Rather, one's position in an organization is the primary source of authority. Regardless of the level of wealth or personal attributes, a bureaucrat's authority derives from his/her position in the organization. This type of authority in Weber's concept is called rational-legal authority which is based upon the acceptance of formal legal definitions of the powers of those placed in ruling positions, where the rights and obligations of both rulers and ruled are specified primarily through legal provision (Page, 1992: 8). The most important notion of rational-legal authority is that authority is associated with offices or positions within offices rather than with the officials who occupy them. Other than the rational-legal authority, Weber identifies another two types of authority in the organization: traditional and charismatic authorities. Traditional authority is based on belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them. Followers will comply with the person who occupies the traditionally sanctioned position of authority. However, this type of authority is seen by Weber as less efficient because the leader is not chosen on the basis of competence. According to the charismatic authority, it results from the devotion to the specific and exceptional

sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person. The leader is obeyed by virtue of the followers' personal trust and belief in the leader's powers or revelations. Administrative staffs, a hierarchy of authority, and rules and regulations are not necessary for establishing charismatic authority. Rather, it is belief in the leader that creates loyalty to a charismatic leader who might be a source of revolutionary change in modern society. The relationship between followers and a charismatic leader is therefore always emotional and not based on tradition or legality (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 71).

The third characteristic of bureaucracy is that operations are governed by a consistent system of abstract rules and consist of application of these rules to particular cases (Henderson and Parsons, 1947 cited in Blau and Meyer, 1987: 20). Standardized systems and explicit rules and regulations are designed to assure uniformity in the performance of every task and to define the responsibility of each member and their relationships in the organization. The rules of each organization specify the area of responsibility for each of its members.

Fourth, official obligations are conducted in a spirit of formalistic impersonality without hatred or passion and also without affection or enthusiasm (Henderson and Parsons, 1947 cited in Blau and Meyer, 1987: 20). Impersonal detachment promotes objectivity and prevents irrational action as well as such inequitable treatment as favoritism on the one hand or discrimination on the other (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 29). This impersonal detachment must prevail not only within an organization, but also toward clients.

Fifth, employees of bureaucratic organization are protected from arbitrary dismissal and can hold office permanently. Employment is a career position, and the system of promotion is based on seniority and an achievement or merit system. These features of bureaucracy encourage loyalty to the organization.

Finally, experience shows that the bureaucratic organization is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency. Particularly, when the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly delimited (Gerth and Mill, 1946 cited in Shafritz and Hyde, 2007: 43). Bureaucracy is able to solve distinctive organizational problems of maximizing coordination and control and thereby organizational efficiency, not only the productive efficiency of individual employees (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 22).

Pluralist View of Bureaucracy

Weber's is not the only modern analysis of the bureaucratic system. The pluralist school of thought is one of many idealist groups which have examined bureaucracy. Pluralists argue that the contemporary Western political system is a complex balance of power among groups and associations. Every group has the power to exercise a certain influence on the policy-making process but there is no one group monopolizing power as the different groups all check and counterbalance each other

According to pluralism bureaucracy is not a monolithic hierarchy in the state structure. Rather it is a highly fragmented set of agencies that are partly interdependent but are also in fierce competition with each other for survival and supremacy (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 44). Bureaucrats alone cannot rule society and yet no group or person can rule without bureaucrats. Bureaucrats might not always achieve their goals but they can prevent others from achieving theirs. They are constrained by political elites but they are influenced by private interests and are constrained by them too. They constrain others and they are thus but one of several veto groups in pluralist political systems (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 43).

The main obligation of bureaucrats is to implement policy that is created by political parties or politicians who have a commitment to the public to establish such policy. Bureaucratic agencies, according to the pluralist school of thought, also have to mobilize political support for maintaining their own programs including building political bases for their own survival and growth. Political support derives mostly from legislatures which have authority to provide, or withhold, financial resources to bureaucratic agencies, their clients, interest groups that can influence the legislature, the media which can promote their programs, and even the public at large.

Technocratic View of Bureaucracy

The technocratic school of thought is also idealist and is concerned with the nature of bureaucracy. According to the technocratic view, the political system belongs to and is influenced by technicians of administration and of the economy. Within each society, there are two main groups: an elite group who effectively monopolizes power and are able to enjoy its advantages; the masses who are invariably in a dependent position and have no choice but to acquiesce in this arrangement (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 44).

Bureaucratic-technocratic elites exercise their power and replace other elites in determining policy, where policy should be issued by political leaders and carried out by bureaucrats. In modern society, there is no clear distinction between policy-making groups and administrative groups because their respective work is closely related. Nevertheless, while political leaders do indeed issue directives to the administration, the bureaucracy has never been under the control of the political leadership. This control has in fact weakened even in recent years, while the power of officials has increased correspondingly (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 54-56).

According to the technocratic school of thought, the growing power of top bureaucrats is first attributable to increasing government intervention. The increased scope of government activities has led to increased size of government and increases in the power of those who carry out policies of the government – bureaucrats. Secondly, the present tasks of government are more complex, and thus bureaucrats now hold greater power of discretion. More is expected of them, particularly their knowledge. Third, as technology advances and society becomes more complex, political decisions are based increasingly on expert technical knowledge which political leaders – especially those in ministerial positions -- often lack (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 58). Fourth, political and policy decision-making is increasing dependent on information which is in the hands of bureaucrats, particularly top-level bureaucrats. All essential information is organized, manipulated, screened, released and even sometimes distorted by bureaucrats before being sent to political leaders for consideration. Rather than having actual free choice, political leaders choose one (or more) alternatives among several options which have been prepared and mapped out by bureaucrats. The choice may be more formal than real because by monopolizing the relevant expertise and by shaping the relevant information, the bureaucrats define the options. Political leaders are practically compelled to make the choice favored by bureaucratic officials (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 58).

Fifth, most political leaders do not have time and resources to devote to serious consideration of particular issues, which certain bureaucrats might have studied for years. Sixth, most politicians will not be interested in all issues, while bureaucrats are obligated to have some knowledge of all possible policy decisions. Seventh, parliamentary power is in decline. Societal issues have become more complex, requiring greater technical expertise for proper policy-making. Consequently, members of parliament and politicians have been forced to abolish detailed legislation in favor of more general laws. Many functions of laws have been

transferred to bureaucrats for detailed regulation. Finally, there is a regular turnover of ministers and other elected leaders. Consequently, while bureaucrats have enjoyed the benefits of permanence and having more influence within the realm of policy making and implementing, the politicians have become weaker. This situation is especially prevalent in countries with unstable governments.

Corporatist View of Bureaucracy

Corporatism is an institutional arrangement whereby public policy is created through interaction between state leaders and the leadership of a limited number of powerful corporate organizations such as business and industrial corporations, and labor unions. Corporatism is different from pluralism in that only a limited number of non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered and state-licensed groups have such an impact, whereas in pluralism there are many interest groups influencing the policy-making process (Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 64). There are two types of corporatism. In state corporatism, corporate groups are dominated by the state. This type of corporatism can be found in non-democratic societies. In societal corporatism, corporate groups dominate the state. This type of corporatism exists in Western democratic society.

Not all corporatists agree on the exact notion of bureaucracy. But most corporatists believe that the role of bureaucracy is minimal under corporatism. In a corporatist state, there is a joining of private ownership with state control of the economy. The works of state are performed by personnel and organizations or institutions which are not part of the state. Under corporatism, society gravitates toward indirect, informal, nonpublic forms of administration. Thus state intervention is not necessarily synonymous with bureaucratic intervention and corporatism is, in fact, a system of state control without bureaucracy (Winkler, 1977 quoted in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 69).

Corporatists argue that bureaucratic rule introduces rigidity into the system and creates delays in state works, particularly in matter of economic management. Moreover, since there is a limited number of powerful corporate organizations that the state must deal with, a massive administrative apparatus made up of large numbers of bureaucrats is unnecessary because the state uses its financial power as a bargaining tool to come to semi-formal agreements with various groups, thus putting a patina of legality on what is fundamentally the destruction of the rule of law. Private organizations become agents of the state, so-called quasi-non-governmental organizations (Winkler, 1977 quoted in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 70). By

the same token, some state agencies become quasi-governmental organizations. Such agencies are created to allow the central political actors to deny responsibility for what the government is doing. The interests of all major actors thus seem to be best served through a minimalization of bureaucratic power (Winkler, 1977 cited in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 70).

However, there is disagreement as to the notion of bureaucracy under corporatism. Panitch (1980: 165 cited in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 70) argues that it is inconceivable that this could be done without an autonomous bureaucratic arm with independent access to information and capable of supervising the operation of capital. Cawson (1978 cited in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 70) believes that corporatist bargaining institutions are unlikely to replace bureaucracy. Further, as Diamant (1981 quoted in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 70-71) argues, senior bureaucrats who work for a few politicians are actually on the bureaucratic side of corporatism, as their work includes the participation of societal groups.

Marxist View of Bureaucracy

Although Marx did not specifically outline his theory on bureaucracy, he did not set out to abolish it. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, the executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (Mark and Engels, 1969 cited in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 74). Thus the state is the political apparatus of the ruling class -- the capitalist class -- for oppressing the proletarian class.

The state is obligated to serve the interest of the ruling class for several reasons. First, bureaucrats in the commanding posts are able to share the same privileges and interests such as educational opportunity and lifestyle as those in capitalist class. Second, there are no other alternatives for the state since the mode of production in the society is controlled by the capitalist class. Consequently policy-making must be consistent with the needs of the capitalist class. It is said that what is good for the capitalism is good for the society. Whatever the state does for the capitalist class also serves its own interests to remain in power (Miliband, 1977: 72 cited in Etzioni-Halevy, 1983: 75).

III. Bureaucracy in Realities

Bureaucracy developed in societies where there was the development of separate institutional spheres in areas such as economics, politics, and religion. Bureaucracy was first developed by kings in traditional societies in establishing their

rule over feudal-aristocratic forces and for administering and controlling resources created by various economic and social groups. Furthermore, bureaucracy and its administration were created for providing groups with resources as well as political, economic and administrative services that would make them dependent on the rulers.

A century ago, the bureaucratic system might have been regarded as something positive. It created a rational, efficient method of organization. Bureaucracy was acceptable because it brought an end to practice of awarding government jobs as a form of patronage and replaced it with the civil service, or merit system. Bureaucratic organizations were established not only when social, economic and political distinctions led to competition between citizens for scarce resources, but also when elites who held economic and political power faced with external threats (like war) or internal problems (such as economic development and political demand). Bureaucracy was expected to alleviate some of the problems which arose from the divisions between spheres, and they would be able to perform important functions such as the organization of adequate services, coordination of large-scale activities, implementation of policy, allocating resources to different groups and regulation of various intergroup relations and conflict. Bureaucracy worked, however, not because of its efficiency, but because it provided solutions to basic problems people wanted to solve. Furthermore, the bureaucratic model was useful in the slower-paced societies; during the age of hierarchy when only top officials had access to information for decision-making purpose; during a time of mass markets when most people had similar needs and wants; and during a time when people worked with their hands, not their minds.

However, with the creation and growth of the global marketplace and globally-available information in the modern society, as well as niche markets in which customers have become accustomed to high-quality goods and services and extensive choice, the pure bureaucracy may no longer be applicable. Bureaucratic performance creates dissatisfaction among the citizenry. Citizens believe that bureaucrats are working only to serve their own interests rather than those of the people. Bureaucratic agencies have no direct personal experience of improved service or responsibility to citizens and society. Bureaucracy is inflexible, unresponsive, disorganized, error-prone, full of red-tape, uncaring, mismanaged, lacking in innovation, inaccessible, arrogant, humorless, out of touch with the public, dishonest, ignorant, full of internal conflict and competition, distrusting of

employees, and top heavy. The public believes that bureaucracies are prone to covering up mistakes and failures, that they cannot make decisions, that their policies, practices and procedures are rigid, that they stress quantitative measurement, and finally they are inefficient and corrupt.

A reason for inefficiency in bureaucratic systems is the uncertainty in the organizational environment. Bureaucrats are often unsure about how to behave and which way to go. In the meantime, they are pressured by their masters – ministers – the people they are dealing with, and their colleagues. This uncertainty situation derives from the fear of bureaucrats themselves that one's career will be jeopardized or that one's position might be lost (Benveniste, 1983: xvi). They cannot trust anybody within and across organizations. Consequently, they pursue defensive strategies as their way to perform in order to protect their careers. They may protect their programs and themselves by acquiring legitimacy from a set of legislative and court mandates and that will lead to the rigidity of the bureaucratic system. Another way in which bureaucrats reduce environmental uncertainty is to do everything to make their organizations or units and themselves indispensable. This includes their attempts to monopolize information, rendering outsiders unable to determine the basis on which decisions are made (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 23).

Since public offices which are occupied by bureaucrats give bureaucratic power and discretion to those bureaucrats, particularly in the public services and the policy process, corrupt behavior, the worst problem of organizations, often exists. Corruption can be legal or illegal actions depending on the rules and regulations of the organization, but there are such practices which are unacceptable among members of organization. Corruption exists because of the independent discretionary power of the bureaucracy. A public official has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make choices among possible courses of action or inaction (Davis, 1969 cited in Ham and Hill, 1984: 149).

The definition of corruption is very broad. For instance, illegal corruption is any act that violates laws and regulations or rules; mercenary corruption are actions for personal gain or the misuse of power and authority for gains, but not necessarily for monetary reasons; and ideological corruption is a discretionary or illegal act pursued for fomenting the goals of a group. Corruption among bureaucrats not only causes damage to society and to the organization itself but it also causes the erosion of public confidence in professional institutions. Because the construction of professional institutions is an important aspect of building trust, as long as they are

weak and unable to police themselves, they are inevitably subject to corrupt practices.

In addition, there are several critics on the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy. One critic argues that bureaucracy does not facilitate the successful creation of a democratic society. Democratic governance depends upon bureaucratic administration to maintain equal treatment of citizens and to administer large-scale elections and other democratic institutions. At the same time, the power of democratic organizations, whether private or public, poses profound threats to the ability of citizens to control their own lives (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 185). Even Weber also realizes this issue. He believes that bureaucracy is not entirely consistent with democracy; in fact, it is ambivalent toward democracy. Although the concept of impersonal detachment is considered to be an accompaniment of democracy because it leads to the concept of equality before laws, this concept in fact fails to bring about bureaucratic responsiveness to public opinion (Gerth and Mills, 1958 cited in Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 33). The bureaucratic organization is also seen as a form of oligarchy, whereby a few rulers can accumulate special powers and privileges denied to ordinary people in order to serve their own interests (Bogdanor, 1991: 391). This is because those bureaucrats who control large organizations not only exercise power but also have an interest in retaining their power, which may result in their taking actions inconsistent with the norms of democratic governance.

The relationship between bureaucracy and democracy is very problematic because it cannot be precisely said which form – bureaucracy or democracy – is the larger threat to the other. Etzioni-Halevy (1985: 87) proposes three theses regarding this relationship: bureaucracy generates a dilemma for democracy; democracy generates a dilemma for bureaucracy and bureaucrats who run it; and these dilemmas exacerbate strains and power struggles on the political scene. Regarding the first thesis, bureaucracy is becoming more and more independent and powerful and the rules governing the exercise of that power are not clearly defined. Hence bureaucracy poses a threat to the democratic political structure and to the politicians who run it (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 87). In a theory of democracy, people elect politicians and send them to parliament as their representatives. Politicians bring the mandate voters gave them to govern the society. On the other hand, a permanent, non-partisan, non-elected public service brings essential expertise and experience to turn the government's objectives into concrete programs and services (Craft, 2011: 54). The specialized and expert knowledge that bureaucrats have built

up as a consequence of their years of service puts them into an advantageous position when compared with elected politicians. Hence, non-specialists like elected politicians can only control bureaucrats to a limited extent. Moreover, public servants by nature of their control of information and their experience are able to effectively render many decisions a *fait accompli*. Public servants are able to control the type of options politicians choose from, the advice they receive or do not receive and are strategically placed throughout the machinery of government, all of which contribute to their ability to control government (Craft, 2011: 58). However, characteristics of public service like the convention of permanent, neutral and nonpartisan public servants made them independent in several key aspects including a custodial role as the guardian of public interests (Craft, 2011: 55). A powerful independent bureaucracy may be a threat to democracy, but it is necessary for the prevention of political corruption and for safeguarding of proper democratic procedure.

According to the second thesis, democracy generates a dilemma for bureaucracy and bureaucrats who run it because democratic rules are self-contradictory and put bureaucracy in a double bind. Bureaucracy is expected to be both independent and subservient, both responsible for its own actions and subject to ministerial responsibility, both politicized and non-politicized at the same time (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 87). As career bureaucrats, they must be able to serve alternative governments with equal loyalty and responsiveness. That means they need to become apolitical or impartial or political neutral. However, public servants are certainly not required to be impartial or neutral in relation to the government and the opposition. Hence, public servants inevitably engage in politics, much of it highly partisan in nature. They assist ministers in deflecting and rebutting opposition arguments. They loyally implement policies clearly designed to wedge the government's political opponents, thus enhancing the government's electoral chances (Mulgan, 2008: 348). In this regard, if senior bureaucrats publicly show their strong support for politically controversial government policy, they are not in a position to give equal support to a minister from the other side of politics after a change of government. For the question of how much independence or subservience is appropriate, this matter relates to professional integrity that must go beyond obedience to the letter of the law and includes judgments of ethical impropriety. For example, public servants are obligated to question any requests from ministers which might require illegal or ethically improper actions. In this

respect, we can talk of public service independence to signify the obligation of public servants to act independently of government in upholding public integrity. But this ethical impropriety can potentially open a Pandora's box on grounds for independence, including principled objection to the government's chosen policy direction, thus undermining democratic legitimacy and proper responsiveness (Mulgan, 2008: 351).

Referring to the third thesis, those two dilemmas exacerbate strains and power struggles on the political scene because these power struggles take place at the point at which democratic rules of the game break down. They are especially problematic for democracy (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 87). This situation will exist when the role of bureaucracy is not clearly defined, senior bureaucrats have been able – and indeed have sometime felt obligated – to branch out into the bureaucratic-political no-man's land which does not fall clearly within the domain of bureaucracy nor clearly outside it (Etzioni-Halevy, 1985: 97). This is disputed territory. Such circumstance will lead to bureaucrats' participation in politics and that will place them in a double bind; that is to be politicized or apolitical.

IV. Conclusion

Bureaucracy in the Weberian framework is a rational form of large and complex organization that is able to create effectiveness and efficiency for its administration. However, past experience suggests that the Weberian bureaucratic model is not applicable to modern society. The model is no longer credible not because of imperfection in the model itself, but because bureaucrats have distorted bureaucracy to suit their own interests. The problem is further compounded by sub-standard politicians who control bureaucratic works. Although there are many negative attributes of bureaucratic organization, there are no other credible alternate organizational models for administering the nation. The clock cannot be turned back (Blau and Meyer, 1987: 194). A country would not survive without bureaucratic mechanisms. Bureaucracy is a necessary function of the society to administer public works, to maintain peace, security and social order, and to bring about economic growth, prosperity and development to the country. Hence, bureaucratic reform is a must. But this time, the reform should not focus on the system itself – characteristic of failed attempts to reform bureaucracy during the past decades. Instead, there should be an emphasis on the spirit of bureaucrat. Society needs bureaucrats with a public-mind, apolitical, impartial, ethical and professional manners. In addition, the

accountability of public services must be promoted. The main aspects of accountability are transparency, liability, controllability, responsibility and responsiveness. These aspects can be elucidated by several questions to determine accountability, asking whether (Koppell, 2005 quoted in Kim, 2009: S91):

- The organization reveals the facts or its performance (for transparency);
- The organization faces the consequences for its performance (for liability);
- The organization does what the principal (parliament, prime minister, cabinet, etc.) desires (for controllability);
- The organization complies with rules and regulations (for responsibility); and
- The organization fulfills the substantive expectation according to public demand/need (for responsiveness).

However, such bureaucratic accountability could be achieved only if it is accompanied with wise, capable and honest political leaders -- which might be a prerequisite of bureaucratic reform. Certainly, politicians receive a mandate from the public in governing the country. But it is not necessary for bureaucrats to obey all politicians' orders, particularly if they find that such orders are illegal or unethical. Bureaucrats should always keep in mind that the ultimate goal of public administration is the public interest, not their masters' interests.

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