The Internet Politics, Time, and Remembering Trauma*

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บทคัดย่อ

บทความฉบับนี้เสนอว่าอินเทอร์เน็ตคือ
เทคโนโลยีที่จดจำแผลฝังใจ อินเทอร์เน็ตส่งผล
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ปัจจุบัน อินเทอร์เน็ตสะท้อนเข้ามายังปัจจุบันถึง
ตัวแผลฝังใจ ซึ่งเป็นสิ่งที่สมควรถูกฝังกลบไปกับ
อดีต ประการที่สอง อินเทอร์เน็ตเน้น
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ค่าแก่การจดจำและชีวิตที่ไม่สมควรแก่การจดจำ
จนดูราวกับว่ากาลเวลาได้ทำการตัดสินใจที่จะ
จดจำ หรือ ลืมชีวิตอันทรมานใจเหล่านั้น
ถ้าหากกาลเวลาอนุญาตให้เกิดการจดจำความ
ตายของผู้คน ชีวิตของผู้คนเหล่านั้นก็ถือเป็น
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อินเทอร์เน็ตก่อให้เกิดสิ่งที่อาจเรียกว่า
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หนึ่ง เป็นการเน้นย้ำถึงความใกล้ชิดระหว่าง
ผู้รอดชีวิตจากเหตุการณ์ความรุนแรงและผู้ฟัง
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เลือนแผลฝังใจนั้น ทว่าเป็นไปได้ยากที่จะถอน
มันออกจากใจ จนดูราวกับว่าแผลฝังใจยืนกราน
ที่จะคงอยู่ตลอดไป ทางที่สาม ความใกล้ชิด
สุดท้ายบ่งให้เห็นถึงความน่าเยียหยันของสังคม
สมัยใหม่ การใช้เทคโนโลยีในทางที่เป็น
อันตรายสะท้อนว่ามนุษย์ได้เคลื่อนตัวเข้าใกล้
ความเป็นสัตว์เข้าไปทุกที

คำสำคัญ: เวลา, แผลฝังใจ, เทคโนโลยี,
พรมแดนแห่งความใกล้ชิด

Abstract

This article shows that the Internet is a technology to remember trauma. The Internet allows us to realise trauma of people being placed in violent incident. Three main considerations are worth taking for granted. First, the Internet leads to a convergence of the past and the present. The Internet illuminates a trauma supposedly buried in and by the past to the present recognition. Second, the Internet underlines a distinction between life that is worth remembering and life that is not as if time makes a decision to remember or to forget a traumatised life. If time permits a memorisation of some deadly people, such life will be a particular form of life that time chooses to remember, which is different from life that time chooses not. Third, the violent image does travel beyond one border as the Internet displays trauma globally. Those considerations are conditions for a reflection of the politics of the Internet philosophically. That is to say, the Internet creates a so-called 'a zone of proximity' in threefold. First, it highlights the proximity between the survivor from the atrocious incident and the listener. Second, it shows an attempt to forget trauma yet hardly possible to remove it from mind; this is implied that trauma exists eternally. Third, the last zone of proximity points out to the irony of modern society. The use of technology in a harmful way reflects how humans are heading towards becoming-animals.
Keywords: Time, Trauma, Internet Technology, A Zone of Proximity

Introduction

This article shows that the Internet is technology to remember trauma and communicate survivor's testimony to the world. Survivor is a person who remains alive after incident where many people had been killed. This article aims to reflect the politics of internet in a philosophical consideration. It highlights how the act of remembering trauma with the use of Internet leads to a temporal convergence. In consequence, three main considerations are worth taking for granted. First, the Internet allows the incident of the past to be visualised and represented in the present. The Internet illuminates a trauma which is supposedly buried in and by the past to the present recognition. Second, the Internet underlines a distinction between life that is worth remembering and life that is not as if time makes a decision to remember or to forget a traumatised life. If time permits a memorisation of some deadly people, such life will be a particular form of life that time chooses to remember, which is different from life that time chooses not. Third, the traumatic image does travel beyond one border as the Internet displays trauma globally. Those considerations serve as a foundation for a reflection of the politics of the Internet philosophically. That is to say, the Internet creates a zone of proximity in threefold. First, it highlights proximity between the survivor and the listener. Second, another form of proximity shows an attempt to forget trauma yet impossible to remove it from mind; this is implied that trauma exists eternally. Third, the last zone of proximity points out to the irony of modern society. The use of technology in a harmful way alarms us that humans are heading towards becoming-animals.

A Temporal Convergence: Trauma and the Internet

The Internet mediates a convergence of the past and the present to which the succession of the time of the present over the antecedence is trivial. Temporal convergence highlights a revival of things that the past seeks to repress. It allows the emancipation of things the past seeks to suppress and hide. Temporal convergence uncovers stories and matters that the past seeks to erase from mind. The past refuses a trauma to live through the present. Yet, trauma insists to continue with the present. As the Internet revisits the past, the result is the resurrection of trauma and a return of a horrendous image to us. Although we are reluctant to let the trauma of the past disturbing us, the Internet that communicates testimony of the survivor forces us to treat trauma as a political matter. The term political refers to difference and in addition to social discordance as

well as antagonism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). We can perceive such antagonism not only in the offline world, but also online. In some occasions, trauma of survivor directs us to injustice they have experienced. Trauma reflects justice survivors seek to fulfil, yet always deferred. Thus, politics is naturally a matter of antagonism. As survivors are reluctant to forget trauma, antagonism and injustice constitute a temporal convergence. As survivors are in a political mission to fulfil their justice for tragic experiences, this explains why survivors cannot compensate trauma with the present.

One way to grasp tension between the present that ignores the past and temporal convergence that brings the past back into politics lies in a difference of 'time-as-mechanic' and 'time-as-haunting'. Time-as-mechanic is time that forges life to human-being in a way to persuade them to move forward. Time-as-mechanic is relevant to the current human activities. Time-as-mechanic leads to a repetitive pattern in life and treats the past as the impossibility to retrieve. In contrast, time-as-haunting resists time-as-mechanic. Time-as-haunting refers to the resurrection of the traumatic incident of the past. Time-as-haunting destabilises time-as-mechanic. It permits the past to sit in the same ontological level as the present. Time-as-haunting is an act of looking back into the past to identifying with a reminder of the past trauma whilst time-as-mechanic is the presently contextualised time that yields toward the future, concerning specifically on what are presently presented and what would occur in the future. Time-as-haunting highlights a remaining trauma that comes back anytime and anywhere from the past to beat humans. Precisely, as long as trauma of the past is recalled into the present, time-as-haunting shares the same ontology with a temporal convergence.

Spectres constitutes time-as-haunting whilst time-as-mechanic repudiates spectre. The latter continues living in the present by rejecting spectre. In other words, time-as-mechanic is time that looks forward. It tends to negate trauma by denying the spectre of the past. In effect, time-as-haunting aligns with temporal convergence. Once trauma is recalled into the present, it is time-as-haunting that becomes a memorial of violence. At this point, I argue that the Internet is a technology that plays an important role in representing those remnants of the past, namely the traumatised images, incidents, and the psychical wounds of survivors. I also argue that trauma obligates the principle of temporal convergence as well as time-as-haunting and thus diffracting from time-as-mechanic. Following this sort of argument, my focus is a zone of proximity, which is the direct effect of time-as-haunting and temporal

convergence. However, the effects are diverse and multiple. Those effects in respect to temporal convergence and time-as-haunting consist of a communication of memory online, a screen-off memory, and a becoming-animal.

A Communication of Memory Online

The first scenario of temporal convergence is a communication of memory online. It refers to cyberspace that draws together survivors and listeners who are anonymous to the testimony of survivor. The Internet allows survivors to communicate memory and the personal tragic experiences online to the random audiences. This highlights that survivors can share their traumatic experience to listeners. It is a condition in which a communication of memory online is plausible. In 2011, a Vietnamese survivor of the Vietnam War, Tan Le, recalled her memory as one of the boat people fleeing from Vietnam fallen under one-party rule in 1970s at TEDx Women. As the forum uploaded the testimony on the Internet, this is how the communication of memory online is practical. And by the time that the audiences receive the story, this suggests a communication from survivor to listeners. This explains not only that survivors sharing a trauma to others, but also suggests a recognition of trauma in the present.

Le's testimony does not simply signify the painful memory of the other (Sontag, 2003). More profoundly, it is a hope to gain traction with my proposal on temporal convergence. That is to say, time is not successful in burying trauma. Trauma does not flow with time but it can freeze time for us to place a critical thinking upon it. As Le's testimony entails our assumption, we are safe to say that memory about trauma of human insecurity emancipates the repression of the past. Following from this, my question is does this zone of proximity remind us of a German theoretical proposal of 'the theory of communicative action'? The theory which states that communication on the basis of rationality and emancipation does not restrict to a dominant institution (Habermas, 1984). Humans can achieve freedom by means of repudiating a governmental control over their associations. And the final stage of human being in a modern state is to transcend the governmental manipulation over consciousness. Communicative action is a theory that apprehends that men are not subject to the state manipulation. To put the matter more succinctly, communicative action is a German theory that aims to invent itself as 'the action rationality' (Habermas, 1987). This term refers to political actions on the basis of freedom and emancipation. This term is different from 'the

system rationality' (Habermas, 1987), which is a control over public opinion on the basis of wealth, power, and hegemony. Allowing Le to provide testimony reflects 'the action of rationality' because the testimony is outside the influence of the state. In short, this action of rationality highlights how a zone of proximity is practical and conceivable.

Another way to think about a zone of proximity is to resort to another significant German theory, namely 'the communicative memory'. This memory theory assumes that memory is communicated on the basis of everyday life (Assman, 2 0 0 8). Many textual formations such as monuments, museums, arts, designs, letters, archives, newspapers, etc. can convey memory. Communicative memory is memory that enfolds, enforces, and envisions a history of violence such as the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum in Phnom Penh and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington DC. Communicative memory is socially constructed. It reproduces its effect over people's perception of society regardless of a temporal difference. As it is patterned to gain a representational form with an aide of visual images and memorials that sustain it – as if the incident of the past is not buried in and by the past – communicative memory is relevant to a temporal convergence. Communicative memory is far from associating with an emancipatory idiom, unless it resorts to a non-governmental interference of culture that deems to articulate it. For survivors, culture is not just an expression of identity-belonging but culture is responsible for temporal convergence as well as generating a critical dialogue with memory manipulated by state. Culture is a site that enables the revivals of the past including pains and traumas of survivors.

I argue that those two theses are featuring a liberal act of communication. Apparently, communication is practical by means of elucidating trauma inherent in one body, in this case a survivor, to other bodies. I subject the two theses into contestation because they ignore a zone of proximity that appears within one body. That is to say, a struggle of one body to forget the past yet unable to do so. Thus, in the next section, the article will consider the notion of a zone of proximity with a psychoanalytic intervention to grasp a zone of proximity based on the impossibility to forget; a haunting memory that continues beating a traumatised person.

A Screen-Off Memory: an Intervention of Psychoanalysis in a Zone of Proximity
This section argues that it is incomplete to think about zone of proximity based on a communication of memory online. Therefore, we can envisage this

incompletion by resorting to time in a psychoanalytic dimension. As trauma intertwined with a structure of time-as-haunting, it can return anytime, anywhere to astonish survivors; to shock their bodies. This corresponds with what Viet Thanh Nguyen, a Vietnam War refugee, points out during the interview with the *History News Network*. He assumes that human bodies are the carriers of all sorts of memories. Memories entrenched in minds and bodies of the traumatised persons form a distressing image. It continues living with them, timelessly and tirelessly, with or without human recognitions.

Nonetheless, Thanh Nguyen expresses from his experience as a person who spends life in two societies, namely Vietnamese and American societies, that memories are the residues that shape the ways people behave and treating each other. People well consider that memory is a cause that shape how they interact with family members and how they treat each other. However, there are some people whom Thanh Nhuyen thinks do inherit memories even when they do not realise that they do. Unconsciously, "this is a way trauma, even if it is not horrible, can influence people's lives" (Thanh Nguyen, 2017). From this perspective, it is possible for us to extend zone of proximity from a basis of communicating memory online that displays a relationship between survivors and the random audiences to another dimension. This paves a way to proximity within the body of a traumatised person with a kind of memory that they wish to delete from their minds, but unable to do so, unfortunately. Such memory is what psychoanalysis discovers and names it 'a screen-off memory'.

Screen-off memory is memory that individual wishes to delete but it remains intact with the body. Screen-off memory is a memory external to consciousness because consciousness cannot reproduce. It is apparently a memory autonomous from individual's choice in memorising it or forgetting it. Thus, screen-off memory is a spectre. Screen-off memory shares the same characteristic as time-as-haunting; a resistance to forget. Therefore, zone of proximity should incorporate the aspect of screen-off memory. The screen-off memory juxtaposes with memory located in consciousness. This is meant to extend the meaning of a zone of proximity from a sharing worldview of trauma among survivors and random audiences to a juxtaposition of memory grounded in consciousness and memory unbounded to consciousness. The latter refers to screen-off memory which is not entirely 'off' from minds and bodies of the traumatised persons despite the attempts. Put another way, it is a shifting of a paradigm from proximity as an association across bodies to association within the same bodies. That is to say, it is an explication of trauma

from bodies of survivors to bodies of the random audiences to acquire a new meaning of proximity. Such new meaning refers to an association within the body, namely a juxtaposition of memory based on consciousness and a memory autonomous from a control of consciousness to which these two aspects of memories live in one person.

The new meaning of a zone of proximity that requires a correspondence with a screen-off memory is practical in the case of the Timorese survivor of the Santa Cruz massacre[1], Major Alfredo Alves Reinado. By the time that he was asked to give testimony to the Commission for Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation (CAVR) about the invasion of Indonesian troops to Dili in December 1975, and this is how Reinado recounted his childhood memory:

> On that journey I witnessed immense suffering: people dying of hunger, parents killing their children because they were making too much noise and they were worried they would alert the Indonesian military; children leaving their aged parents to die; decaying corpses; and members of political parties killing other Timorese because of political differences. The men who killed for political reasons were very cruel. Their faces were like robots or machines. During the time with the army I saw horrific things ... during an operation in Turiscai I saw them tie the men to trees and rape the women. I saw women being dragged away by two or three men who then used them in whatever way they wanted.
>
> (Reinado Cited in Hyland, 2006)

The Indonesian military adopted Reinado. They treated him as a slave. His testimony indicates not only his childhood memory, but also how he was placed in a precarious situation to witness all the extremes and violent actions under the Indonesian occupation. Reinado's testimony reflects one of the episodes of a childhood memory of the Santa Cruz massacre. To be specific to a screen-off memory, a question is whether Reinado's testimony which is a recounting of childhood memory is reflexive of memory grounded in consciousness or indicative of his screen-off memory. The latter is a memory that he wishes to repress and completely forget but incapable of doing so. The screen-off memory does not appear to be exclusionary 'off' as it sounds to us.

Thus, there is memory that locates in and displaces from consciousness. The latter nonetheless does not literally disappear but sleeps deeply in a mind of a traumatised person. At a time when a traumatic incident takes place, consciousness emerges together with the screen-off memory. Consciousness

and the screen-off memory jointly exit under the same temporal structure following the event of trauma. As trauma is a psychologically perturbing factor dwelled in survivor, survivor may wish to screen off such an agonising experience from his/her mind. Screen-off memory is a will to forget but an insistence from a trauma as a time-as-haunting itself seems to force surrendered to the will to forget. That is to say, consciousness is a psychical apparatus aims at repressing a content of trauma; it tries to erase trauma but unsuccessful. Consciousness is a carrier of trauma. It is a way trauma expresses and communicates to others. But insofar as consciousness is unsuccessful in repressing another crucial content of trauma grounded in a screen-off memory, it is hard for consciousness to represent a full image of trauma. Therefore, the best consciousness can do is to stand as a half-truth and a half-remembrance of trauma. The best consciousness can do is to simulate trauma, to make it appearing as a semblance rather than to be the truth of trauma.

A screen-off memory which consciousness tries to distil and remove comes back to challenge consciousness's representation of trauma. A screen-off memory is juxtaposed with consciousness in a way that it marks symptom of consciousness itself. It marks the impossibility for consciousness to represent trauma. Screen-off memory is a memory that consciousness seeks to repress, but it eventually strikes back and resists consciousness's representation of trauma. Screen-off memory appears in a form of "the act of memory that strikes us as strange" (Freud 2001). This means that there is a content of trauma that remains on the side of the screen-off memory, which informs that trauma that roots in consciousness is a lack. Whilst consciousness located in consciousness is a lack, the screen-off memory is an element that fills in the gap. At this point, trauma has a dual meaning. It can be a consciousness and a screen-off memory. For a consciousness, it is a repressive apparatus that tries to suppress or screen trauma off, but unsuccessful. The screen-off memory in turn shows a location of trauma unbounded to consciousness. "How to step out of one's consciousness?" (Lacan, 1980), a famous French psychoanalyst asks such a perplexing question. Perhaps the sufficient response is that trauma hits that person, strikes him or her so hard in a form of a strange image. A person does not control trauma, he or she cannot determine trauma; it is a time-as-haunting that overpowers human. Rather, it is a trauma, a screen-off which is not entirely 'off', that returns to astonish them. That phantom keeps coming back to shock them. And this is an essence which is derived from the logic of temporal convergence and

time-as-haunting, which is something that consciousness does not commit to celebrate.

At this point, it is compelling to ask whether Reinado's testimony represents trauma based on consciousness or a screen-off memory. Given that a zone of proximity in a new meaning occurs within the same body, the expression of trauma in one person can be derived from consciousness as well as from a psychical site external to consciousness, and this process is carried out within a body of a traumatised person not others. This zone of proximity departs from the theses of 'a communicative action' and 'a communicative memory' that commonly believe in a transmission of a subjective worldview, including trauma of one body to other, but inferring instead to a perturbation within a person, within the same body. When Reinado expresses in a pitiful tone that 'the men who killed for political reasons were very cruel...their faces were like robots or machines'. The theses of communicative action and communicative memory are indifferent to the imbalance between consciousness's representation of trauma and a screen-off memory that does not bound to consciousness, which, as a result, makes the communication of trauma from one body to others impossible. But our thesis on this second zone of proximity asks instead whether Reinado's testimony on childhood memory is reflexive of his consciousness's representation of trauma or indicative of his screen-off memory.

As a result, there are five inconclusive scenarios that we should take into account without giving one weight over others. Precisely, from A-E, all different scenarios are enmeshed in a significant conversation and what we should do for the organisation of our thought is to outline and clarify them.

(A) Reinado tries to express the traumatic incident he had experienced in the past, so trauma that he expresses to us is founded in his consciousness. His consciousness is capable of representing a full image of trauma and which means that his consciousness in its task of representing trauma is not a lack.

(B) Reinado's attempt is to represent a traumatic incident to the global audiences but his consciousness has a limitation. Unfortunately, this makes his consciousness impossible to represent trauma in its full image. To which this means that his consciousness is a lack but he seems unable to realise it.

(C) Reinado tries to erase trauma from his mind, but trauma comes back to haunt him. So which, means that his consciousness is defeated by trauma unbounded to consciousness, and we are allowed by all means to think that trauma is time-as-haunting; trauma is not a time-as-mechanic that tends to

look forward and treat the timely present as the most important.

(D) Reinado's case appears to us that regardless of its location, either situated in consciousness or external to consciousness yet returnable to the body, it shows that in order to understand trauma, what we need to know about it is to grasp it via a zone of proximity, a conjunction of trauma grounded in consciousness and the one grounded outside consciousness.

(E) Internet allows itself as a technologized space as to which we can observe all of these interrelations among trauma, consciousness, screen-off memory, time-as-haunting, a zone of proximity, and a temporal convergence.

Although it is useful that a psychoanalytic intervention allows us to grasp a juxtaposition of memory grounded in consciousness and memory external to it, a psychoanalytic intervention is lack of an insight to another scenario of proximity. That is to say, such theoretical account negates a possibility that the civilised men by their involvements with violence and technological advance do turn them into inhuman or animals. Thus, the third scenario of a zone of proximity is a becoming-animal by which the argument is humans are not different from animals. But this does not mean that psychoanalysis is no longer significant in relation to a becoming-animal. As will be demonstrated in the next section, becoming-animal highlights how the civilised and technologized men are intimate with animals in wildlife, and also psychoanalysis plays a key role in accessing to a psychological dimension of those whose life are transformed into a war-machine as a result of war and violence.

A Becoming-Animal as a Zone of Proximity of men and animals

This section highlights that the third scenario of a temporal convergence displayed in the Internet is that a current form of the civilised human is a becoming-animal. Becoming-animal is the empirical and historically valid in events in world politics ranging from Hiroshima, Kosovo, Paris, Madrid, Berlin, Aleppo, and a Parliament bomb in London. Becoming-animal is neither surreal nor transcendental. Becoming-animal of human-being is real, and, in particular, the context of becoming-animal where this is located is the world politics of war and a technological advancement. Becoming-animal does not suggest that humans are imitating animal behaviour. In other words, becoming-animal demonstrates a reality in a historical and empirical sense that it is neither simulation nor imitation of animal behaviour that promulgates becoming-animal in a life of a modernised human-being. It rather refers to a nature of human being predestined to share a quality of animal which is

synonymous with inhuman character, barbarism, and cruelty in a time of war. Consider Tranh Nguyen's reflection on the nature of human being which is destined to share a quality of inhuman trait during the interview:

> *So we are short-sighted if celebrate the humanities is to think that something called inhuman is outside of that.* From my perspective, looking at this war and at other wars it was human beings that produced these actions so any meaningful humanities project has to acknowledge that *the inhumane exists and that inhumane actions and their consequences have to be subjects of the humanities as well.* That's why I call on *the humanities to include the humanity and inhumanity simultaneously because both are innate within us.*
>
> (Thanh Nguyen Cited in Lindley, 2017; my italic)

From what Tran Nguyen expresses that 'the inhumane exists and that inhumane actions and their consequences have to be subjects of the humanities as well', this demonstrates that human beings under the context of technological advancement and modern war are destined as a becoming-animal. Arguably, becoming animal serves as a proper expression of life of men being forced to surround by war societies, crime societies, killing societies, and other dangerous situations. Thus, the relationship of men and war is pertained to the reality that men are linked to animals. The reality has done enough for us to witness becoming-animal of human being. Given Tran Nguyen's affective statement that 'so we are short-sighted if celebrate the humanities is to think that something called inhuman is outside of that', another hidden perspective of Vietnam War is up on the horizon, namely a becoming-animal. It highlights that men of both races are commonly turned into animals. This is because the American perspective on civil war in Vietnam highlights a containment of communism, that is, to prevent Southeast Asian country from fallen into domino of communism influence. In contrast, Vietnamese perspective on war highlights that Western countries must be responsible for human rights abuse and tortures in Vietnam, and, in addition, the loss of the US in Vietnam War serves as an official memory enamoured with nationalist sentiment in the post-Vietnam War.

However, Tran Nguyen's reflection provides the alternative perspective by way of leaving behind the influences of those two contradictory perspectives. Tran Nguyen's perspective shifts away from both American and Vietnamese perspectives and pointing out to a human dark side, the becoming-animal. His perspective implies a missing piece of thought in which those two perspectives

dismiss, that is, his perspective is to identify with the view that men on both races are turned into animals. Becoming-animal is an unwelcomed identity embodied in human-beings that men are reluctant to accept it. Given the context of war and technological prowess to appear as the initial backdrops, becoming-animal is the immaterial horror which comprises of an act in breeding, spreading, forming, mingling, glistening, and increasing itself as a dark element innate in human genes.

I argue that it is hard for becoming-animal to be simply underscored as men are transformed into 'a war machine' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). From the perspective of time-as-haunting, men are relatively turned into a being which is extensively, and more broadly, forced to kill, forced to be killed, and joy to kill. War machine is a thesis that only describes life of the political men which are historically and politically produced as life that can kill and destroy others. Although the concept hints some verisimilitude with regards to history of violence, the concept does not extend to the context of time in the same way as time-as-haunting. More than a hypothesis of 'a war machine', life in this time-as-haunting scenario displays a traumatised life of human being which is forced to kill, forced to be killed, and joy to kill. Although war machine shares some thought with time-as-haunting in terms of life which is forced to kill others, the concept does not clearly elaborate the political process to which men are victimised to be the killers. In its emphasis on men being turned into animals for killing others, it provides less articulatory space to consider political life which is vulnerable to be destroyed or life which must be killed. In addition, the war machine does not describe how men are joy to kill others and also the concept does not respond in an appreciative way on how and under what condition of ideology in which men can kill others without guilty. Specifically, war machine seeks to identify with a form-of-life produced by the sovereign state in wartime whilst excruciating a dimension of temporal convergence in which a past trauma can return into the present. Thus, war machine frames itself as a concept that identifies with a form-of-life produced by the belligerent states but it has a barrier with a contextual temporisation (such as to permit the past trauma into the same foothold with the present) and also a psychoanalytic dimension (such as guilty and haunting). Concerning the latter, war machine provides small thinking on the haunting memory. Although war machine points out a form-of-life emanated from war and violence, it needs to work more with a temporisation and a psychological dimension.

We can afford our dialogues with a thesis on war machine in twofold. First, concerning temporisation, war machine is indifferent to a possibility that the Internet is technology that enables the image of war and trauma to rise above the graveyard of the past by enfolding itself with the time of the present. If war machine considers on temporisation, it is possible for us to grasp and identify how war machine is not just an occurrence in a history but also the reality of the present due to the affordability of the Internet which deterritorialises a distinction of past and present. Second, insofar as war machine discards a psychoanalytic consideration, this makes the concept unable to read or access to the mind of those who suffer from war, unfortunately. The concept simply engages us with a politicised life as a war machine, but it displaces us from tarrying with *the jouissance* (a surplus enjoyment) of men in killing their enemies. The concept does not elaborate how such politicised life feels any guilty of being turned into animals and how they cope with a guilty (if any). Insofar as the French masters of the concept, war machine, do not find psychoanalysis captivating, this dismisses them from concerning the possibility that men who are 'weaponised' as war machine are haunted by their own acts and deeds of being transformed into war machine. Moreover, the two masters are likely to miss their thinking on trauma as haunting memory coming back in anonymity to haunt men who are produced as war machine. If the French masters do not omit psychoanalysis from playing a considerable part in a thesis of a becoming-animal, it will be possible for their followers to access to a mentality or a psychical condition of the war machine men, more effectively.

Those two remarks signal that becoming-animal has to be sensitive to a content of temporisation and psychological dimension. Those are significant contents that the notion war machine seems to negate. In order to understand this, we should not rush to celebrate the death of language and extensively the death of narrative. It is impossible for us to access to a psychological dimension of a traumatised person with a naïve assumption that the narrator (writer) is dead with which his/her verbal and writing expressions are etched in the past. The expression of a person who possesses of knowledge on trauma is crucial, insofar as it is only a reserved ticket for us to contact with his or her mental condition. By being committed to handling with care a narrative of a traumatised person – a sufferer from violence and war – this allows us to grasp how human boundary is mutated. The narrator or writer is death is a metaphysical concept derived from a semiotic, but which makes us at risk from being negated by a crucial source of knowledge on trauma which is character-

ised as a haunting memory. Language remains significant – albeit insignificant in the semiotics' assumption. As Tranh Nguyen claims that 'the humanities [are] to include the humanity and inhumanity simultaneously because both are innate within us', our thesis on time-as-haunting leads us to take into account two consequential scenarios. One the one hand, our concern on a verbal expression rather than assuming the death of narrator suggests us that it is the becoming-animal in human being that is brought back into the time of the present; a haunting image that despite a thing of subtraction coming back to haunt a traumatised men. On the other, becoming-animal in men should be taken in a wider perspective than war machine. Becoming-animal should not only constitute with life that is produced or weaponised as a killing machine as initiated by the two French masters, but it should also incorporate life that is vulnerable to be killed, which is analogous to a small animal being hunted down by a giant predator. It should also include life that is full of enjoyment to kill, which is the ideological establishment imposed from the above to them that motivates them to kill others without mercy. It should take into account guilty, repent, and a will to commemorate, and a will to forgive in men, who are forced to be a war machine. All of these will not be the impossible scenarios, wherewith the concept can even reconceptualise itself, if the French masters simply allow temporisation and psychoanalysis in their concept rather than negating them.

Thus, becoming-animal should be entwined not only with war-machine, but also time-as-haunting and the psychoanalytical dimension to which these allow becoming-animal to reconceptualise itself. Moreover, in relation to the sovereign state, becoming-animal can form inside the state administration e.g. warriors occupy tremendous power; they are like hunters whilst civilians are hunted like animals. Warriors and civilians are the same; they are becoming-animals. However, becoming-animals can also form outside a state administration, out of the state control, such as criminal groups, riot groups, political protest groups, and asceticism groups. And in order to preserve the sovereign power, state must act relatively more wildly by becoming 'more' animals than those becoming-animals in order to suppress them. This zone of traumatisation where all lives appear as becoming-animals is the zone that folds together powers, affects, subjectivities, subject-less, sovereignties, memories, perception, resistance, conformism, violence, transformation, conscious, and unconscious.

We are committed to perceiving a symptom of world politics; a scar of violence and trauma. If a zone of traumatisation comprises of becoming animal produced by the state and the one that is enacted as a resistance outside the state boundary, it will be that the enfoldment is empirical, a molecular, and the real. The enfoldment is empirical and the real in a sense that it has a material, hence, itself is not the ideal. The enfoldment is a molecular because it is unconscious that must be conscious, the imperceptible that must be perceptible. Traumatisation is a zone of becoming-animals that signifies the assemble of affects, emotions, memories, violence, subjects, sovereignties, and subject-less, who are reduced to zero-level. It is the frontier that envelopes horrors and haunting memories, urging us to perceive the imperceptible, to perceive the ignorance that is not supposed to be ignored. This frontier expands its boundary, connecting people throughout the globe to observe this zone of traumatisation because the Internet technology helps spread the image.

Accordingly, the Internet technology is instrumental to depict the zone of traumatisation. The Internet technology is a cyberspace that not only brings the past into the present, but also to uncover all imperceptible particles, which are supposed to be buried in and by the past, such as memories, subjects, deaths, violence, subjects, and subject-less back into perception (Sarraute, 1 9 6 3). The Internet technology morphs assemble of the imperceptible particles, supplying all matters to our perception. In other words, those imperceptible particles are the smalls that evade the gaze but in the end converge with the gaze; the Internet technology makes this scenario of micro-politics possible in the horizon of world politics. It is this temporal convergence structured by Internet technology in which the living and death persons not only become witnesses to the zone of traumatisation, but they are also drawn into the zone of proximity. Becoming-animals in men produce a zone of traumatisation in which many imperceptible particles enter the zone of proximity. In consequence, the meaning of life and death are assembled, peace and war are converged, trauma and reality are co-existed, and the living persons are permitted to share the experience of the dead people. This process is impossible without the assemblage of the imperceptible particles as well as the Internet technology as the cyberspace illuminating them.

In addition, in this zone of proximity, men learn that by appearance they are not animals but the reality of violence in world politics in turn show that they are animals in a sense that they are drawn close to the becoming-lions, becoming-tigers, becoming-a little animal, becoming-a hunter, becoming-a predator, and becoming-being hunted; so in reality, not physically, they are

becoming-animals by molecular proximity. Men enter into the zone of proximity where humans and non-human beings are not anymore separated, because they are experiencing inhumanity in their bodies. It is obvious that when being placed under the context of war and traumatic situation, men do have animal molecules (Deleuze and Guattari 2004). But the French masters should inform more properly that becoming-animals that occur to humans at the molecular level are the unconscious incidents. But what happens at the molecular level does not mean that it has no reality, does not mean that it is not real or has no material. Becoming animals in men are not ideal, evidently at a time of war. The Internet does not allow the horrific image of the real to be succeeded by time. It brings the political image back in; the past is the real that returns to the present, articulating to us how our life are not different from those in wildlife. Trauma and the psychical wounds of survivors make them incline to share the experience of the dead people, and deep down to the zone of proximity of life and death underlies and underscores astoundingly to us the becoming animals of men; be they are becoming-tigers, lions, hunters-, rabbits, and dears; the hunters and the victims.

Conclusion

This article argues that three scenarios of a zone of proximity emerge after a temporal convergence. The first scenarios is a communication in a cyberspace among survivor, a testimony on violence, and an anonymous audience, which thereby generating what German thinkers term as the communicative action and the communicative memory, respectively. However, the article challenges that this zone of proximity illustrates the interaction between bodies to bodies, rather than a conflict within a body. Therefore, in the second scenario, the article diverges from theses on communicative action and communicative memory to associate with psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis allows another dimension of zone of proximity by way of juxtaposing consciousness and the screen-off memory together. Screen-off memory comes back to haunt consciousness, although consciousness assumes that screen-off memory is already 'erased off' from the body. It is a zone of proximity within a body in a sense that a strange image of trauma which consciousness presumes to expel comes back to haunt that traumatised body. Still, psychoanalysis denies a possibility of thought that the civilised men by their involvements with violence and technological advance do turn them into inhuman or animals. As a result, the third scenario of a zone of proximity is a becoming-

animal by which the argument is humans are not different from animals. Perhaps, the most paradoxical form of a zone of proximity is men and animals, or, nature and culture are intertwined. But the question we must ask is does this becoming-animal is part of our reality or a withdrawal from a reality? To which such question can be dealt based on the alternatives of any philosophical proposals about time such as a temporal divergence in a context of the Internet and face politics in a way that departs from a temporal convergence, a main consideration of this article, of course.

Notes

[1] The Santa Cruz massacre which is known in the alternative name as the Dili massacre was a violence conducted by the Indonesian army on 12 November 1991 against at least 250 members of pro-independence demonstrators neared the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili during the operation occupying East Timor declared by the Indonesian government. According to a journalist of Democracy Now, Amy Goodman who was a witness of the event, the massacre was backed up by the government in Washington. The event was genocide of East Timor, but the operation had been supported by the government outside the country.

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