



## Antonov An-225 Mriya: The world's largest aircraft destroyed—why?

Kiraphat Khianthongkul<sup>a</sup>, Poowin Bunyavejchewin<sup>b,\*</sup>, Bordin Saisaeng<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Institute of Metropolitan Development, Navamindradhiraj University, Bangkok 10300, Thailand

<sup>b</sup> Thammasat University Research Unit in History and International Politics, Institute of East Asian Studies, Thammasat University, Pathum Thani 12121, Thailand

<sup>c</sup> Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University, Nakhon Pathom 73170, Thailand

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### Abstract

This study examined the underlying reasons for the Russian attack on Antonov An-225 Mriya at Hostomel Airport, that occurred during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This analysis was conducted through a broad lens of national interest and international aviation. Politico-symbolic, economic, and strategic considerations might have driven the Kremlin to order the destruction of the world's largest aircraft. Politico-symbolically, the aircraft symbolizes Ukraine. Thus, by destroying it, Russia sent a political message to Ukrainians and leaders in other capitals that Kyiv is under Russian orbit. The idea was to make it clear that no foreign power is allowed to interfere or influence the Ukrainian state of affairs. Economically, the destruction of the Mriya and the Russian seizure of the Antonov Company's hub were intended to disrupt the independent growth of the Ukrainian aviation sector, thus forcing it to rely on Russia's aeronautic manufacturers. Strategically, because the European Union and US-led military alliance have heavily relied on Ukraine's Antonov Company's fleets of heavy cargo aircraft to fill their strategic airlift gaps, the Kremlin's order has disrupted and negatively affected military logistics in Europe. Furthermore, by destroying the only Antonov An-225 aircraft and seizing the Antonov Company's key infrastructure at Hostomel Airport, Russia has also barred China from obtaining aerospace technology transfers from the underfunded Ukrainian aviation industry. The findings of this study can serve as a reference for future investigations on the wider Russia–Ukraine war.

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### Introduction

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine by conducting a raid on Kyiv and attacked the capital and other cities (Bhagwat, 2022). Headlines covering the invasion flooded news media worldwide. Despite the substantial influx of news stories

regarding the ongoing war in Ukraine, one headline baffled the authors—Antonov An-225 Mriya (hereafter, An-225), the world's largest aircraft, was destroyed by Russian strikes at Hostomel Airport (Agence France-Presse [AFP], 2022a). Prima facie, An-225 was merely another victim of the war. However, considering the aircraft's utility for Russia, both economically and militarily, destroying An-225, wherein Moscow could reap benefits from seizing and mobilizing this large jet, did not appear rational.

\* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: [pw6@staff.tu.ac.th](mailto:pw6@staff.tu.ac.th) (P. Bunyavejchewin).

This incident merits further examination. Understanding this small-scale event may provide insights into the wider war, especially the strategic implications behind Russia's latest conquest of the Ukrainian territory. Therefore, this study examined why Russia destroyed the world's largest air cargo plane regardless of its utility for the Russian side. In particular, the goals of this study were: (1) to describe relevant facts regarding the incident including information on the An-225; (2) examine the strategic environment in which the event occurred; and (3) identify possible reasons underlying Russia's attack on the Ukrainian aircraft.

In this study, we performed an analysis based on the following set of hypothetical assumptions defined a priori: (1) state leaders are rational actors, at least in cost-benefit terms; (2) war initiation is calculated on a rational basis; and (3) no accidental cause exists for the use of military force by the state. The former two assumptions are based on empirical evidence (Bennett & Stam, 2002; Bueno De Mesquita & Lalman, 1986), whereas the latter is hypothetically conditioned for facilitating logical reasoning. In addition to these assumptions, this study provides a state-centric answer using a broad lens of national interest, which, according to political realism, is the currency of politics among nations.

## Literature Review

### *National Interest and International Aviation*

National interest involves a range of issues, pertaining from security to economic well-being to prestige (Nuechterlein, 1976). All states act in accordance with their best national interest using various policy tools. From 1945 onward, military airpower has become a coercive instrument used by almost every state to safeguard its security (Byman et al., 1999). However, the role of civil aviation (e.g., airlines and airports) in preserving and promoting national interest is subtle but critical, although scholars have mostly overlooked it. Here, we present a concise review of how states use civil aviation entities as part of statecraft.

Aviation, including civilian air activities, is international by its nature (McCormick, 1929). Civil aviation has been a promising policy tool with many potential applications, wherein the state may avail it to seek and secure national interest (Jönsson, 1981; Libby, 1992).

Politically, air transport can serve as a propaganda tool for the state to disseminate political messages to the public at home and abroad (Puffer, 1943). Flag carriers have performed these types of tasks. For instance, many governments of newly independent nations deliberately chose national airlines as an instrument for advocating nation-building and fostering national identity

(Raguraman, 1997; Young, 1979). Furthermore, civil aviation, represented by flag carriers, and aviation industries have served as the nonmaterial interests of the state. Moreover, national pride and prestige (Lehner, 1995; Wassenbergh, 1962) were considered highly politically significant by major powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union, during the Cold War (Gormly, 2015).

Economically, international civil aviation is a crucial revenue generator for various economies globally (Steinen, 2006). This is particularly true for developing countries, especially those whose economic growth relies on foreign tourism. (Schlumberger & Weisskopf, 2014). Moreover, while encountering liberalization at regional and global levels, some governments mobilized flag carriers carrying a symbol of nationhood as kindling to spark and fuel economic nationalism to justify their policies of protectionism (Lehner, 1995; Thornton, 1971).

Militarily, civil aviation is considered an essential part of national security and defense. Particularly, powerful and war-prone nations highly value the security/protection of civil aviation industries (Gormly, 2015; Svik, 2020). One of the main reasons for doing so is the similarity of design in civilian and military aircraft. The state governments often use civilian and military according to their requirements. Therefore, it can be inferred that the separation of the civil and military uses of airpower is neither realistic nor practical strategically (Cooper, 1946; Sachdev, 2011). For example, in the United States, selected passenger and cargo aircraft, owned by American firms, have been contractually committed to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAFT). The CRAFT supports military operations in extensive emergencies (Gourdin, 2020). Thus, both civil and military flights are an integral part of the national airpower.

Furthermore, US CRAFT is functionally and conceptually referred to as "strategic airlift." This concept is briefly discussed in the next section.

### *Strategic Airlift*

Strategic airlift is used as jargon in strategic and defense studies. The term refers to "the ability to transport large numbers of troops and cargo over long distances, usually between [home base] and theatres of operations abroad" (Bishnoi, 2006, p. 6). In particular, according to Baker et al. (2002), strategic airlift involves

...a large-scale military deployment [using air transport assets]...[In doing so,] massive amounts of equipment and large numbers of personnel must be transported over long distances in a short amount of time...Strategic (intercontinental) airlift played the dominant role in rapidly moving troops and cargo in the important weeks leading up to the war (p. 582).

More precisely, strategic airlift is a constituent of military logistics in general and air power projection logistics in particular (Amouzegar et al., 2004; Suit, 1991).

Strategic airlift mainly concerns major powers and their military alliances who operate enormous fleets of airlifters (Horta, 2021; Vasilescu, 2011). However, in particular circumstances, when the air force fleet of airlifters does not seem adequate to complete a mission, the airline firms and civilian aircraft are called upon to aid airlift operations. (see Salmi, 2020). For instance, during the recent US withdrawal from Afghanistan, six US-registered airlines were reportedly called by the Pentagon to assist American evacuations from Kabul (Peters, 2021).

Even Western European powers (i.e., Great Britain and France) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the American-led alliance in Europe, have allegedly reported insufficient airlift capacities (Donnet, 2015; Hood, 2009; Vasilescu, 2011). This problem has indicated their need to rely on Ukraine's Antonov Airlines' fleet of heavy airlifters—notably, seven Antonov An-124s Ruslan (hereafter, An-124) and the world's only An-225 (Falcus, 2020)—for transporting oversized cargo (Efstathiou, 2019). Consequently, the destruction of the sole An-225 and extensive damage to the Antonov Company's facilities tend to have a more detrimental impact on the US-led NATO's airlift capacity needs than Ukraine's.

## Methodology

### Case Study Research

This study addressed two fields of research: (1) international relations (more precisely, strategic studies); and (2) aviation. A primary case-study method, commonly applied in both fields, (see Bennett & Elman, 2007; Wiggins & Stevens, 2016), was adopted as a research strategy. In particular, this is a case-centered type of research, as described by Woodwell (2014); however, the purpose of a case study here is not solely descriptive or to present a chronological event of the battle of Hostomel Airport, resulting in the destruction of An-225. This study aimed to interpret the event through a broad lens of multidimensional links between national interest and international aviation focusing on strategic airlift.

More precisely, the study aimed to determine the underlying reasons for the incident that occurred at Hostomel Airport from a state-centric view of national interest. The authors focused on the intentions and impact of the Kremlin's order to destroy the Mriya in order to provide a realistic/pragmatic picture of the Ukraine war, viable especially for policy circles.

## Data Sources and Analysis

This study was based on various secondary resources, including international media outlets, scholarly work, and policy-oriented publications. For data interpretation, the authors performed the structured-focused analysis reported by Woodwell (2014), which is methodologically derived from a case-study method. It was structured simply because the specific research question guided the analysis. Moreover, the analysis was straightforward and focused only on certain aspects of the case study, as guided by the conceptual frame (pp. 160–163).

## Results and Discussion

### Relevant Facts of the Case

This section provides relevant facts about the An-225 aircraft, facilitating readers to understand the importance of this massive cargo plane. Antonov An-225 Mriya was built in the late 1980s by the Antonov Design Bureau in Ukraine to serve as an air transporter for the Soviet Union's Buran space program and its massive weaponry, such as medium- and long-range missiles (Smith, 2015). The aircraft could carry almost all types of USSR military equipment over a strategic distance from the Soviet theater command (Acuff, 1990, pp. 14–15). Since the independence of Ukraine in 1991, An-225, along with several fleets of Antonov airlifters, has been owned by Antonov Airlines, the subdivision of the Antonov Company, which is Ukraine's state-owned enterprise (Mlejnek, 2021).

The Antonov Company has been at the core of the aircraft manufacturing industry in Ukraine—one of the few countries having capabilities in military and civilian aircraft production—which was identified as a critical sector for driving the country's economic growth (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2012). Given that, state-owned Antonov was described as the "...flagship of the Ukrainian economy" (Mlejnek, 2021, p. 37). The relative competitiveness of the company's fleets of unique airlifters includes, *inter alia*, "...quality of aerostructure design, ability to use unpaved airfields, and flexibility of operations" (OECD, 2012, p. 173).

Antonov Airlines is a state-owned business; therefore, it is considered a civil air operator. Accordingly, An-225 and fleets of heavy airlifters were registered as civilian aircrafts. Antonov Airlines has also been offering its assets/services for charter and its customers range from commercial firms to state agencies to intergovernmental organizations, including the European Union (EU) and NATO (Vlachos-Dengler, 2007). Due to their exceptionally high payload capacities, An-225 and

An-124s have operated numerous charter flights worldwide. **Table 1** indicates the relative performance of both aircraft types. Antonov's heavy airlift fleets have also served as a revenue generator for both the company and the wider Ukrainian economy (Grebennikov & Smolnikov, 2019; Mamo, 2021).

Antonov An-225, whose name "Mriya" means "dream" in Ukrainian, symbolized Ukraine's national brand at the international level (Getmanchuk, 2020). It was destroyed by Russian troops at the Hostomel Airport (also known as Antonov Airport) on February 27, 2022, during Russia's invasion of Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital (AFP, 2022a).

### *Ukraine and Aeropolitics in Eastern Europe*

In the previous section, essential facts about the world's largest airlifter were discussed. In this section, we focused on the strategic environment in which the An-225 was recently destroyed. The strategic environment refers to a series of situations underlying "...the interactions of international politics, diplomacy, economics, and military power" (Baviera, 2016, p. 58). Here, the geographic foci are predominantly Eastern Europe and the wider region. The strategic environment is discussed through the general lens of the multidimensional linkage of national interest and international aviation. In turn, this may help interpret Russia's motives behind its destruction of Ukraine's Mriya. The two environmental contexts worth being mentioned are as follows:

#### *Europe's strategic airlift gap*

Since the end of the Cold War, a strategic airlift capability gap among NATO allies has been increasingly widening. Thus, the available airlift capability is inadequate to fulfill the practical need for NATO operations (Hages, 2014; Joint Air Power Competence

Centre, 2011). NATO has imposed a substantial burden on US airlift fleets in conducting military and humanitarian relief missions in many places outside Europe, from Afghanistan through Iraq to Haiti (Hood, 2009). **Table 2** lists the number of heavy airlifters owned by European nations and the United States.

To tackle airlift shortfalls, NATO implemented two initiatives: (1) Strategic Airlift International Solution (SALIS), launched in November 2002; and (2) Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC), initiated in September 2008. Ukraine's Antonov Company has played a crucial role in the SALIS by overcoming NATO's strategic heavy airlift capacity shortage. Regarding SALIS, Germany-based Antonov Logistics SALIS (ALS), an agent of the Antonov Company, signed a contract with the NATO Support Procurement Agency in 2018, granting guaranteed immediate access to its five An-124s within several days. In addition, the same contract has provided access to the company's An-225 for NATO missions. In 2021, the contract was reportedly extended for another 5 years (Turner, 2021).

The involvement of the Antonov Company in NATO's and EU's missions has been tangible. During the coronavirus pandemic, Ukraine's flagship aircraft, the An-225 Mriya, operated many flights to transport medical equipment on behalf of the aforementioned organizations (Getmanchuk, 2020). Consequently, this labeled Ukraine's flagship cargo plane as a symbol of hope to the public in European countries during the devastating pandemic (Agence France-Presse [AFP], 2022b).

#### *China's involvement in Ukraine's aviation industry*

Apart from the aforementioned state of affairs, another environmental context relevant to Russia's action at the Antonov Airport is China's attempt to get involved in Ukraine's aviation sector. Since President Xi Jinping

**Table 1** Cargo aircraft types

Aircraft type	Cargo volume (m <sup>3</sup> )	Cargo mass (kg)	Maximum range (km)
Antonov An-225	1,300	250,000	15,400
Antonov An-124	1,050	150,000	5,400
Boeing B767-300F <sup>a</sup>	438	52,700	6,025
McDonnell Douglas MD-11F <sup>a</sup>	440	91,670	7,320

Note: a = aircraft types commonly operated by major freight airlines (e.g., FedEx Express, and UPS Airlines).

Sources: Adapted from Kornienko (2013, p. 45)

**Table 2** US and European heavy airlifters in 2011 and 2018

Countries	Year	Number	Aircraft type
Europe (i.e., Great Britain, France, Germany, and Spain)	2018	63	Airbus A400M, Boeing C-17A Globemaster III
Europe (i.e., Great Britain)	2011	7	Boeing C-17A Globemaster III
United States	2018	264	Boeing C-17A Globemaster III, Lockheed C-5M Super Galaxy
United States	2011	194	Boeing C-17A Globemaster III, Lockheed C-5B/C/M Galaxy

Note: Adapted from Efstathiou (2019)

took the office of President in 2013, China has emerged as Ukraine's key economic partner. In 2015, for example, China was on the list of Ukraine's top five largest trade partners, accounting for approximately 33 percent of the country's exports and 57 percent of imports from the Asia-Pacific (Shelest, 2018, pp. 64–65). Moreover, Beijing considers Kyiv a potential substitute for Moscow's mega-infrastructure projects, which are part of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative strategy (Shelest, 2018).

Despite having less than 1 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ukraine, China has reportedly and consistently expressed a strong interest in the Ukrainian aviation industry and the reproduction of the An-225 prototype (Nijjar, 2017). In terms of national airpower, a considerable proportion of made-in-China aircraft models have arguably mimicked Soviet aircraft prototypes (Lee, 1997; Medeiros et al., 2005; Roblin, 2021). Thus, Ukraine—a hub of Antonov aviation technology—has remained strategically crucial to the Chinese government (Cliff et al., 2011; Medeiros et al., 2005). Its significance has increased due to President Xi's aspiration to upraise China's international standing to a position equivalent to that of the United States (Taranenko, 2018).

Since military power is considered the main attribute of any superpower, China too is trying to increase its military prowess and modernize it at an unprecedented rate. Beijing's rapidly expanding role worldwide has caused a problem of airlift capability deficit and is baffling the NATO allies. (Horta, 2021; Stratfor, 2013). China attempts to purchase and access the An-225 aircraft's design and technological model to recommence the world's largest aircraft production in mainland China (D'Costa, 2016). The deal between the Chinese firm and Antonov Company was inked in August 2016 and included a delivery of several new An-225s to China by 2019 (Uhalley, 2018). However, the Ukrainian court subsequently blocked and halted the deal, citing national security concerns, because a Chinese takeover can have severe repercussions on Ukraine's vital interests (Laurenson, 2018).

In the aftermath of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine directly came into the competition with Russia in the global aviation market. Ukrainian firms strived to find new markets for generating income to sustain businesses and economic growth. This, in turn, placed Ukraine at risk of being exploited by China and other emerging powers to acquire low-cost aviation technology transfers (Oxford Analytica, 2016).

#### *Probable Reasons Behind Russia's Decision to Destroy the Mriya*

The previous section outlined the strategic environment surrounding the Russian destruction of the Antonov An-225 Mriya. Considering the strategic reality, this section discusses probable reasons behind Russia's

action, conceptually based on the primacy of national interest. At least three sets of probable reasons propelled leaders in Moscow to order the destruction of the world's largest aircraft.

#### *Politico-symbolic reasons*

Although An-225 was a one-of-a-kind giant with an exceptional airlift capacity, wherein Russian armed forces could have gained access or used it militarily, Mriya—the dream—had to be ruined for symbolic punishment. The *raison d'être* of the Russian action is best exemplified by the press release of the Ukrboronprom, a state-owned defense enterprise, which read, “Russia has targeted Mriya as a symbol of the capabilities of Ukrainian aviation” (as cited in Goldstein, 2022). Thus, regardless of the aircraft's colossal capacity, destroying An-225 and damaging the Antonov Airfield connoted the decay of Ukraine's prestige, both nationally and globally.

By diminishing Ukrainian prestige, Russia directly sent a loud political message to political elites in Kyiv and outside that Ukraine is under the Russian orbit. Moscow is capable of destroying Kyiv anytime it wants. Politico-symbolically, President Vladimir Putin's signal has been hard and fast: without Russia's political will, the dream of Ukrainians is nothing but a wild imagination. Moreover, militarily, destroying the enemy's symbols of dream and hope may be considered Russia's psychological warfare operation to make Ukrainian troops and civilians quail and quake at the invasion, thereby plausibly reducing the level of armed resistance.

#### *Economic reasons*

Due to their larger payload capacities compared with other civilian cargo aircraft available in the global shipping market, Antonov Company's An-225 and An-124s had long been a cash generator for both Ukrainian firms and economic sectors (Kornienko, 2013). Since An-225 was destroyed while two Antonov Airlines' An-124s were grounded at Hostomel (Rivero, 2022), Russia might have intended to cause severe damage to Ukraine's aircraft manufacturing industry and crumple the Ukrainian economy in the long run (Goldstein, 2022).

By the same token, sabotaging and seizing the essential vehicles and infrastructure of the Antonov Company, including destroying An-225, disrupted the growth of Ukraine's aircraft manufacturing industry. Irrespective of any war outcome, Kyiv's aerospace sector would be severely affected, stalled, and fall under Russian dependence. In a worst-case scenario, Russia might take over Ukraine's aeronautic products and key resources, especially armed supplies wherein the Russian military has experienced shortfalls after Kyiv banned defense exports due to Moscow's annexation of Crimea in early 2014 (Johannesson, 2017).

### Strategic reasons

Considering the aforementioned surrounding conditions, strategic considerations arguably seem to have guided Russia's decision to destroy Ukraine's An-225 and cause havoc in Antonov Company's air transport assets. This offensive attack has helped Russia exert a disruptive domino effect on Europe, from the EU to the US-led NATO to other individual nations, with respect to strategic air mobility. This derives from the fact that they all have considerably relied on Antonov Airlines' massive airlifters. Without them, EU's and NATO's operations, either military logistics or humanitarian relief, would experience problems, unavoidably adding a greater burden on the United States.

Repercussions on the Russian opposition's strategic airlift capabilities are unequivocal, and no further discussion is necessary. However, another strategic implication is subtly revealed by the incident but has been vastly understated, namely the "China factor." It has been evident that China has attempted to obtain aerospace technology transfers from Ukraine's underfunded aviation manufacturing firms, including its failed attempt at acquiring the An-225 production program. Given major power rivalries, where power is intrinsically relative, Beijing's gain of the Ukrainian know-how would be definitely at the expense of Moscow's overall footing. This point is explained by Grieco (1988) as he posited, "...states worry that today's friend may be tomorrow's enemy in war, and fear that achievements of...gains that advantage a friend in the present might produce a more dangerous potential foe in the future" (p. 487).

Arguably, Grieco's (1988) proposition on "relative-gain" considerations among states, mentioned above, could explain Russia's drop-off in exporting armaments to China since 2006, whence the Chinese began cloning Soviet-made machines to produce its homegrown equipment and materiel ("Testing the 'limitless,'" 2022). The Kremlin's unwillingness to sell its advanced technology made Beijing turn to Kyiv to import Soviet know-how that Moscow did not want to sell (Nizhnikau & Kaczmarski, 2020).

China's growing presence and influence over the government in Kyiv have profoundly concerned and disturbed the Kremlin since Russia has viewed Ukraine as within its *de facto* sphere of influence ("Testing the 'limitless,'" 2022). By treating Ukraine as Russia's near abroad, President Putin has claimed a Russian *droit de regard* over the Ukrainian nation. He sent a diplomatic signal demanding that President Xi restrained the expanding Chinese involvement in Ukraine and broader regions, namely Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Liik, 2021; Wong, 2022). To be precise, Russia has deeply mistrusted and always been discomfited by rising China (Scott, 2022; Ying, 2016). If China could take over more-advanced know-how from Ukraine—marked by the

Chinese attempt to Sinicize the An-225 production program—it would definitely be at the expense of Russia.

Considering all the above, since China was very close to its goal (i.e., purchasing access to the An-225 production), preventing Beijing from obtaining vital aviation technology transfers has been critical strategically to the Kremlin. Hence, Russia's destruction of Ukraine's An-225 might be a strategically calculated choice. Lastly, it is noteworthy to register that Turkey and India reportedly approached the Ukrainian government to take part in building the second Mriya (Venckunas, 2021).

### Conclusion and Recommendation

Unlike other analyses on the Russia–Ukraine war, this study particularly focused on a specific event, namely the Russian attack on Ukraine's Antonov An-225 Mriya, the world's largest aircraft, at the battle of Hostomel Airport. The analysis was performed through a broad lens of the multidimensional linkage of national interest and international aviation. The study identified three probable reasons motivating the Kremlin's order to destroy An-225. They reflected Moscow's politico-symbolic, economic, and strategic considerations shedding light on strategic, tactical, and operational decisions.

As of the time of writing this article (March 2022), the Russian invasion of Ukraine is still going on. Such a bold move by the Kremlin has appeared to bring Russia into a long war with fierce responses from the US-led coalition of democracies, abruptly and severely damaging the Russian economy. Given that, some observers jumped to conclusions that President Putin made mistakes and miscalculations (e.g., Gould-Davies, 2022). We argue that such conclusions were too fast and too soon. Furthermore, the Russian leader appears to be a rational actor in cost-benefit terms, as indicated by the recent empirical evidence (Langlois, 2012). Therefore, it is beneficial to understand the factors that transpired, leading to war.

By analyzing this small-scale incident at the Antonov Airport, some conclusive recommendations concerning future research on the more expansive Russia–Ukraine war can be drawn. Although war is undoubtedly tragic, interpreting such a tragedy must exclude any black-and-white prejudice, most likely derived from beliefs in universal morality. Instead, the primacy of national interest should be the only lens through which analysts shall look. Second, a political realist critique of EU membership extension and NATO expansion into Moscow's sphere of influence (i.e., Ukraine and former Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe) is perceived by those in the Kremlin as threatening core Russian interests (Mearsheimer, 2014, 2022) and should not be underestimated or deemed obsolete. For the Kremlin,

getting back control of Ukraine may be a calculated risk overriding a ruined economy caused by international sanctions. Lastly, but equally essential, the China factor might have played a role in Russia's decision to mobilize armed forces against Ukraine. It can be inferred that President Putin, through invasion, has tried to eliminate China's involvement in the Ukrainian aviation sector and broader defense technology sectors by exercising a monopoly over security-related industries.

## Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.

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