POLITICAL PARTY AND PARTY SYSTEM
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA AND THAILAND)

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Abstract

Political and party elites use money and muscle power as means to overcome the problems of mass democracy. Like was the method of representation had been invented to overcome the inconveniences of direct democracy and keep power safely in the hands of the elites, party leaders may be resorting to the use of money and muscle power to get through the elections in a mass democracy. In the olden days structured violence and social domination were helpful to win elections. When such means are no more feasible, at least to the extent to win election, parties and candidates have resorted to market principles-setting price for vote for which the possessors of the commodity are willing to part with. Where that is not possible or sufficient, coercion is employed.

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Introduction

A democracy needs strong and sustainable political parties with the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate their ability to govern for the public good. Political parties originated in their modern form in Europe and the United States in the 19th century, along with the electoral and parliamentary systems, whose development reflects the evolution of parties. The term party has since come to be applied to all organized groups seeking political power, whether by democratic elections or by revolution.

The second half of the eighteenth century had just begun when Voltaire concisely stated in the encyclopedia "the term party is not in itself loathsome the term faction always is" Latin verb 'facere' indicates apolitical group bent on a disruptive and harmful behavior. Party as well as derives from Latin from the verb 'partire', which means to divide. Party basically conveyed the idea of part to sever, it is not derogatory rather an analytical construct. from partire means. Partition it later was the English use represented partaking(partnership and participation)when part became party we have two semantic pull the derivation with taking part and there by with shairing, on the other The second half of the eighteenth century had just begun when Voltaire concisely stated in the encyclopedia "the term party is not in itself loathsome the term faction always is" Latin verb facere

indicates apolitical group bent on a disruptive and harmful behavior. Party as well as derives from Latin from the verb partire, which means to divide. Party basically conveyed the idea of part to sever, it is not derogatory rather an analytical construct. From partire means partition it later was the English use represented partaking(partnership and participation) when part became party we have two semantic pull the derivation from partire to devide on the one hand on the other association with taking part and there by with shairing, on the other hand. The later association is stonger then the derivative.18nth century writer really never disentangled the two concepts. As the faction is concrete group where as party the abstract grouping reference to real world we find the two indistinguishable. Parties divide people upon principles .while they participte in the parliament.

David Hume first essay on parties in 1742, later burke joined this issue in 1770,.hume,s major contribution through his essay of 1742 of parties in general hume clarified the difference between party and faction drawn by Bolingbroke in allocating the two words hume analysis concentrates on the real faction which are subdivided into three classes, faction from (1)interest (2)principle (3)affection .In earlier, prerevolutionary, aristocratic and monarchical regimes, the political process unfolded within restricted circles. Cliques and factions, grouped around particular noblemen or

influential personalities, were opposed to one another.

      Now a days democracy needs strong and sustainable political parties with the capacity to represent citizens and provide policy choices that demonstrate their ability to govern for the public good. With an increasing disconnect between citizens and their elected leaders, a decline in political activism, and a growing sophistication of anti-democratic forces, democratic political parties are continually challenged. Political parties and electoral systems have long been the object of much research and study. In order to be Democratic, a country needs to have political parties and an electoral system. The variations in the number of political parties and types of electoral systems found throughout the world leads on to wonder whether there is an ideal combination of the two that increases democracy. Are there an ideal number of parties that a country should try to foster? Does the choice of an electoral system have consequences beyond the electing of ofucials? Political parties are a basis for democratic rule. Strong parties may not be necessary for establishing a democratic government, but they are necessary for 'the long-term consolidation of broad-based representative government' (Dix 1992, 489). Klaus Jurgen Hedrich (2002, 18) asserts that parties are vital to representative democracy; 'They are agents and conductors of political power,mediating betweed

government and society. They also articulate the political interests of society, which are later translated into state policies and A democracy needs strong and sustainable political parties with the capacity to represent citizen and provide policy choices that demonstrate their ability to govern for the pubic good. With an increasing disconnect between citizens and their elected leaders, a decline in political activism, and a growing sophistication of anti-democratic forces, democratic political parties are continually challenged. Strong political parties are essential to open, competitive democratic politics, particularly in emerging democracies.

      Democracy is a bundle of dynamic self-government processes, both social and official in nature. They are visible not just as participation in public life (for example, advocacy, voting, assembly, contributing time and money to groups) but also in the form of state, political, and social institutions (constitution and the bodies they establish, credible rights, a free press, electoral and judicial processes, shared values, and social organizations) that both sustain participation and restrain its excesses. and institution are essential: Participation without institutions is chaotic, ineffective, and likely to serve the few at the expense of the many. Institution without participation are an empty exercise at best-and more often, at worst, tools, of control from above. People are most likely to participate politically in vigorous, sustained ways

when they have a stake in the outcomes. Paradoxically, while democracy is a public good, self-interest is critical to its vitality. Open, competitive, and fair participation within a framework of legitimate, credible institutions enables citizens and groups to defend their interests, to act on issues they care about, and to hold officials accountable for their decisions.

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A political party is a political organization that typically seeks to influence government policy, usually by nominating their own candidates and trying to seat them in political office. Parties participate in electoral campaigns, education outreach or protest actions. Parties often espouse an expressed ideology or vision bolstered by a written platform with specific goals, forming a coalition among disparate interests. Socially rooted interests can moderate conflict, aggregate demands into public policy backed by a working consensus, and earn legitimacy. Political parties are among the most crucial institutions in these processes. Parties embody both participation, and they are essential to negotiating a balance between them. In their many forms,

they do not just contest elections, but also mobilize and organize the social forces that energize democracy, on a continuing basis. Even the most determined democrats require a lasting organizational base, a pool of resources, and legal standing in the political process. Parties connect leaders to followers and simplify political choices, framing them in terms of citizens' own interests. In many societies, parties provide a range of nonpolitical benefits as well, including social activities, recognition and status for people and commitment functions identified long ago by E.E. Schattschneider but frequently overlooked today. Simply put, where parties are strong, interest groups need them more than they need interest groups. Party leaders can, and usually must, be brokers, working out compromises and seeing that these are honored. Parties by themselves do not preclude people seeking power through arms, bribery, the power of a charismatic leader, or the strength of the mob, and parties themselves are open to a range of abuses. But without them, citizens and societies have few genuinely democratic alternatives.

Given these substantial questions concerning the interpretation of these findings, it is important to systematically survey the types of parties that exist in today's democracies, and to examine the kinds of functions that are performed or privileged by each party type. It is not unreasonable to expect that no single party type can simultaneously achieve

a number of often incompatible political and social objectives, and that the displacement of one party type by another may have a substantial impact on the character and quality of democracy in the world today.

A Typology of Parties

Indeed, the literature is already rich with various categories of party type that have been in use for decades. However, we have not found the existing models of parties sufficient to capture all of the important characteristics of parties dealt with in this volume. This is for several reasons. First, all of the existing typologies of political parties were derived from studies of West European parties over the past century and a half cordingly, they fail to capture important distinguishing features of parties in other parts of the world. This is certainly true of parties that have emerged in developing countries whose populations exhibit considerable ethnic, religious, or linguistic diversity, upon which competitive parties have most commonly been based. It is even true of the United States, whose two highly decentralized parties fit uneasily with most existing party typologies. Thus while we acknowledge the many contribution of empirical studies of parties that have been based upon these traditional West European party models, we believe that the study of parties in other world regions would be greatly enhanced by a reassessment and broadening of these typologies. Second, the existing party types have

been based on a wide variety of criteria, and little or no effort has been invested in an attempt to make the resulting party types consistent with one another. Some typologies are functionalist, classifying parties on the basis of some specific goal or organizational raison d'^etre that they pursue. Sigmund Neumann, for example, distinguishes between three types of parties: "Parties of individual representation" articulate the demands of specific social groups. "Parties of social Integration" have well-developed organization and provide a wide variety of services to members, encapsulating them within a partisan community, in exchange for which they count on financial contributions and volunteered services of members during election campaigns. "Political Party and Party System (with special reference to India and Thailand)" have more ambitious goals of seizing power and radically transforming societies, demanding the full commitment and unquestioning obedience of members. Herbert Kitschelt differentiates parties that emphasize the "logic of electoral competition" from those (such as his "left libertarian" type) that place much greater stress on the "logic of constituency representation." And Richard Katz and Peter Mair implicitly advance a functionalist logic in setting forth the model of the "cartel party," in which public financing of parties and the expanded role of the state induce party leaders to restrain competition and seek primarily to perpetuate themselves

in power in order to avail themselves of these new resources.

This is particularly necessary in an effort (as represented Richard Gunther and Larry Diamond) to include countries outside of Western Europe within a preliminary eomparative analysis. Thus we shall increase the number of party types, building on models and terminology previously advanced by other scholars, while at the same time imposing some semblance of order on some of the criteria most commonly used as the basis of party typologies. Specifically, we will tryto avoid the common temptation to introduce a new party type on ad hoc grounds, simply on the basis of a conclusion that a particular case cannot be adequately explained using the existing typologies. Instead, we will systematically place all of our party models within a comprehensive framework constructed on the basis of three criteria : 1) the size of formal organization of the party and the extent of the functions they perform (ranging from thin, elite-based parties to extensive mass-based party organizations) ; 2) whether the party is tolerant and pluralistic or proto-hegemonic in its objectives and behavioral style; and 3) its distinguishing programmatic or ideological commitments.

Conclusion

The shift of parties "from society to the state" may be a necessary "survival strategy", but for Bartolini and Mair, it threatens to undermine parties' legitimacy in the long run. Indeed, they speculate that the present widespread malaise of parties may well derive from the "ever more pronounced separation" between "their enhanced and increasingly well protected institutional role" between "their enhanced and increasingly well protected institutional role" and the "seeming erosion of their relevance within the wider society". As their representative capacity declines, so does the ability of parties to control individual and group behavior and so foster "political integration". If parties cannot mediate and restrain societal demands, Bartolini and Mair wonder, can they continue to provide institutional integration (by harmonizing the working of different political institutions)? This is the question they leave unanswered. But they do underscore the institutional danger to parties of their excessive regulation by public law. Parties, they insist, must "recover their autonomy and coherence". This means not only less legal regulation and intervention, but a renewed emphasis on the authority of party politicians (as opposed to technical experts or popular referenda). At the same time, parties must clean up their own corruption and lack of transparency while finding ways to bridge "the sense of growing 'insulation' of the political class from popular concerns and grievances".

The evidence in this book demonstrates. That across a widely varying range of democracies, political parties are losing

the support and involvement of citizens, even at they remain essential for structuring electoral competition and organizing governance. In our view, this growing breach is not healthy for democracy, but nether is it entirely beyond the scope of intelligent policy and institutional renovation to repair. Parties need funding in order to survive, compete, and perform their democratic functions, both during and between election campaigns. Yet political money and those who donate it ar widely seen as problematie---at times, even, as threats to democracy. There is no consensus on how parties should be funded, or on the regulation of contributions, expenditures, and public disclosure. Indeed, the legal and constitutional status of parties is often poorly defined, and their political roles are frequently misunderstood. Rules affecting the ways money is contributed, raised, spent, and disclosed---or, for that matter, a laissez faire policy or ineffective legislation in any of those areas---will have powerful implications for the quality and sustainability of democratic processes. Most such policies, however, aim less at providing essential resources for competitive parties than at controlling corruption.

They often reflect a reform ideology that is reflexively anti-political---a "civic vision" of politics as the pursuit of the public interest and of government as existing to provide technically sound administration. But both the civic vision and the goal of controlling corruption

are essentially public goods: The abuse of public roles and resources for private benefit, although in many societies terms like "public", "private", and "abuse" are matters of considerable political dispute. Much corruption in established democracies involves efforts by business or wealthy individuals to buy or rent influence in government. But in much of the rest of the world, the problem is also, or primarily, that powerful state and political figures plunder the economy. Both contention over key aspects of the definition, and the impunity with which officials enrich themselves in many countries, underline the importance of free and open political contention--- in the firat instance, to draw key boundaries and distinctions, and in the latter, to check abuses of political power and create alternatives to corrupt government. Linkages between them. Particularly in the new and emerging democracies that concern us here, corruption control is unlikely to strengthen parties or deepen democratic politics (and may thus ironically deprive anticorruption policies of crucial support in the process). Political finance policies that best aid democratic development are primarily distributive, bringing vital resources to parties and civil society. In the end, while corruption control seems to emphasize restraints and de-emphasize parties, a country seeking to use political finance tools to enhance democratic politics should consider whom it wishes to empower, and what sorts of

activities it intends to support, rather than emphasizing restrictions and

Limits Parties, looked at that way, are not potential corruption problems, but rather essential agents of the kind of competition, organization, mobilization, and accountability that enliven democracy and ingrain it into a nation's daily life. Beyond ensuring that entry into politics is relatively open, the goal is not to create some sort of "level playing field" for the whole system (whatever that much-overworked

Strong parties require money. Further, raising and spending political money---far from skunking up the civic garden party---can enhance the vitality of democratic processes. Even if we do not accept the current contention that money literally is speech—an odd sort of political transubstantiation---contributing money is an important form of political participation that effectively signals the intensity of one's views. Appealing to citizens and civil society for funds is a party-building activity and a way to strengthen leader-follower connections. Less well recognized is the role of such fund-raising in building party accountability---in the ways money is used, in the political and policy strategies parties pursue, and with respect to internal party democracy. Stated thus, political finance policy seems simple. But in practice it poses some of the most complex policy choices facing democracies, both emerging and established. Political finance policies come in pieces, with a variety of components addressing goals that are not always mutually compatible or clearly thought out. Restrictions on contributions and'

Spending, public subsidies, matching funds or tax incentives to make contributions, and compliance and oversight procedures may all be extensive or minimal. Funds may be channeled to or through parties, individual candidate committees, or a range of independent bodies. Individual citizens, voluntary organizations, committees representing various kinds of interests, and businesses themselves may be allowed or encouraged to contribute and spend funds, or they may be selectively barred. A major issue is whether to allow contributions from foreign individuals and groups. Qualification thresholds for subsidies may be high or low, broadly or narrowly based. Data on contributions and expenditures may be made available widely and quickly or not at all. Enforcement is a continuing dilemma. Many countries

Have well-drafted laws on the books that are widely ignored. Further, political finance policies are, for want of a better way to put it, political: They are never neutral, but rather create significant political advantages and disadvantages that affect outcomes in a range of ways. Finally, democracies themselves vary considerably and are always works in progress. Policy that "works" in one society might be harmful In another, and both will be obliged to rethink their approaches with change

over time. Underlying all such issues is the law of unintended comsequences: Given the stakes of electoral politics and the fertile imaginations of interested participants, the implications of various combinations of policies in any one particular settin may be difficlt to foresee. There is therefore no single best political finance system. Organization and mobilization remain primary challenges here, but accountability is crucial, too, in order to separate broad-based, bona fide parties from other sorts of formations (for example, personal allowing, cultural or national redemption movements, or the political extensions of business rganizations) and to encourage the growth of the former. To some extent, that sort of determination can be made as resources are targeted to political parties. Further, genuine mass-based parties can and should be used as organizational conduits for any subsidies that might be available to leaders' and candidates' organizations, as well as to affiliated groups; and in all cases, such funding should be linked to organization-building activities (again, voter registration, civic education) and party electoral success. This gives such groups a stake in building successful, mass-based parties. It is temption to extend this logic to civil society groups, too, but over the long run one would hope to see those groups become autonomous partners in party politics, rather than see civil society reorganized by parties themselves response to economic incentives.

Disclosure plays less of a role in this setting than in the previous one, and as a more targeted accountability measure (where do parties get their money? What do they spend it on?), though if well administered and credible it might help reuse mutual suspicions among parties, their leadership, and their might be too many parties, or the fragmentation of large, catch-all parties may leave significant portions of the population without a political voice. Here again, prominent

Pathways to electoral success--- the role, outlined by Schattschneider as best for enabling them to enhance mass participation and democratic accountability while checking the clout of divisive and extremist groups. Parties are, again, made the conduits for subsidies; those subsidies

Are linked to the building of a mass base; and blind trusts remain available as an option ofr those who wish to contribute to parties and to do so with some sense of security. While parties and civil society groups alike continue to benefit from subsidies in this scenario, and while the latterbenefit from favored tax treatment and incentives to encourage contributions, distincentives are now created to act through personal or party-related organizations. Favored tax treatment ends for those groups. (Depending on what they are, these groups might be treated differently: Party youth groups and foundations might continue to enjoy charitable

status but not tax incentives for contributing to such groups, and a party-owned newspaper or broadcast outlet would be taxed like any other business). Similarly, both party-related organizations and candidates' or leaders' Political Parties and Democracy in Theoretical and Practical Perspectives personal organizations would be subject to strict contribution limits, paired with incentives to work through parties : The former could be subjected to increasingly demanding disclosure requirements and limits on receipts and expenditures, and might be subjected to less favorable tax treatment, all in the name of preserving parties' comparative advantages as vehicles for political contention (and thus encouraging more competition overall). Such disincentives must not, of course, be allowed to become repressive, but with careful thought about all aspects of funding they can be made effective. Civil society groupr and individual contributors may still wish to have a bling trust option; there is a potential tradeoff there, however, with the goal of making parties more attractive political vehicles for groups and individuals seeking particular kinds of policies. Finally, to the extent that

Consolidates, it will likely have to enhance its capacity to administer whatever set of political finance policies it chooses, since the growing incentives to seek influence through electoral politics will likely encourage a range of fund raising and spending

techniques that are difficult to anticipate. One important type of in-kind support can be made part of the system: Free media as a competition-enhancing device could be made available to parties and civil society groups on terms that encourage cooperation and coalition building. Electoral systems have not received much discussion here, in part because the topic itself is so vast. But in this scenario, where the survival of parties and the freedom to participate are not necessarily at issue, yet the party system is not producing decisive results, electoral laws become particularly important and potentially effective. Such laws should encourage parties to coalesce in multiple-party groupings, perhaps by requiring majorities with run-off rounds to win seats or, in PR systems, by imposing higher threshold requirements for winning any seats at all. Party list systems Political Finance Policy, Parties, and Democratic Development that foster competition within rather than among parties Should be avoided. In that connection, emphasizing the parties rather than individual candidate organizations as funding vehicles will be crucial, too. Thought should be given also to how parties choose their leaders and what their governance powers ought to be. While those issues are the topic of another paper in this series, it is worth noting here that, in this last scenario, it would be optimal to see party leaders emerge through the party organization with widespread

backing from voters, members, and party contributors, rather than to see them set up personal parties or conduct hostile takeovers of existing ones. Much the same is true of candidates and nominees, for where a party nomination is crucial to being a competitive candidate, and where that endorsement involves demonstrating significant support and where that endorsement involves demonstrating significant support and commitment to party principles, there, too, we are less likely to see personal followings undercut party politics. At the same time, however, parties must be open to dissenting viewpoints, and contests within parties must be open and honestly conducted.

We also find a growing concern about the declining quality of leadership; increasingly inability of parties to intervene in policy process and policy making in the representative bodies; and the way party functionaries desert, split and destroy parties for their selfish ends. Parties have come to be increasingly looked upon by leaders, functionsries and supporters as means to fulfil personal interests. Representative bodies became more as arenas for party

leaders to attack each other and settle personal scores, than to deliberate upon policies and legislate. Party leaders spend much of the time in the Parliament and Legislative Assemblies on discussion on party quarrels or matters that involve issues relating to swindling public wealth. They seem do so more out of envy at others' chances, not with an intent to protect public wealth or promote public interest.

Now we are living in an era of liberalization and deregulation. Parties earlier have played an important role under the command economy. It is assumed that in a deregulated economy, the leverage of parties in the distribution of valued goods would go down. The public sector, centralized planning and huge funds available with the government gave shape to the parties in India for a long time. Given the structure of international and Indian economy, the attempts to universalize the model of capitalist democracy, and the present models of economic development pursued by the governments at the State and Union levels might cause problems, perpetuate dependent development and increase inequalities.

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