William James, Pluralism, and Feminism

Abstract

The objectives of this article are, firstly, to examine the different senses of William James’ pluralism – metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and religious – in order to better understand its significance, mechanism, and implications in James’ philosophy. It seeks to show that James’ epistemological, ethical, and religious pluralisms do not necessarily rest on any metaphysical foundation, but rather share a systematic antireductionism. Nevertheless, in order to thoroughly understand James’ overall pluralism, his metaphysical pluralism is no less essential than the others. Secondly, it seeks to discuss and evaluate the possible contributions of James’ pluralism to feminist philosophy, especially to pragmatist feminism, by focusing on the role of subjectivity in knowledge construction and analyzing the philosophical implications of acknowledging the epistemological significance of a knower’s subjectivities. This will help to reveal not only the social and political dimensions of knowledge and its construction, but also the potential to dissolve long-standing dichotomies that feminist philosophers have taken issue with.