เศรษฐศาสตร์ว่าด้วยการกำกับดูแลอัตราค่าบริการ: ทฤษฎีและการประยุกต์ใช้ในกิจการโทรคมนาคม
Keywords:
Telecommunication Industry, Rate of Return regulation, Price Cap regulationAbstract
This article collects the economic studies related to the tariff regulation for an application in telecommunication industry. The tariff regulation purposes to enlarge the social welfare. The Social welfare will be enlarged by reducing the consumer tariff and increasing the operator profit as the result of decreasing the production cost due to the tariff regulated. There are two types of tariff regulation. Rate of Return regulation is inefficient because the operators have incentive to expand the production cost and to consequently increase tariff. Price Cap regulation is more efficient by incentive operators to reduce the production cost for increasing the profit. This type of the regulation has been applied widespread in many countries. In Thailand, Rate of Return regulation is regularly applied to telecommunication industry. However, Price Cap regulation will be allowed if the operator submits proposal to the regulator. Price Cap regulation should be induced by the regulator according to the principle of this type of the regulation.
References
ประกาศ กทช. เรื่อง อัตราขั้นสูงของค่าบริการและการเรียกเก็บเงินค่าบริการล่วงหน้าในกิจการโทรคมนาคม พ.ศ.2549.
(25 กันยายน 2549). ราชกิจจานุเบกษา.
ประกาศ กสทช. เรื่องอัตราขั้นสูงของค่าบริการโทรคมนาคมสำหรับบริการโทรศัพท์เคลื่อนที่ประเภทเสียงภายในประเทศ
พ.ศ. 2555. (3 เมษายน 2555). ราชกิจจานุเบกษา.
พระราชบัญญัติการแข่งขันทางการค้า พ.ศ.2560. (7 กรกฎาคม 2560). ราชกิจจานุเบกษา.
พระราชบัญญัติว่าด้วยราคาสินค้าและบริการ พ.ศ.2542. (22 มีนาคม 2542). ราชกิจจานุเบกษา.
Ai, C., & Sappington, D. (2001). The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunication Industry.
Mimeo,University of Florida.
Armstrong, M., Cowan, S., & Vickers, J. (1994). Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience.
Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
Averch, H., & Johnson, L. (1962). Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint. American Economic Review, 52,
-1069.
Baron, D., & Myerson, R. (1982). Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs. Econometrica, 50.
Bernstein, J., & Sappington, D. (1998). Setting the X Factor in Price Cap Regulation Plans. Cambridge,MA.: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Cailaud, B., & Tirole, J. (2001). Essential Facility Financing and Market Structure. Mineo, IDEI, Toulouse.
Clarke, E. (1971). Multipart Pricing of Public Goods. Public Choice, 11, 17-33.
Engle, E., Fisher, R., & Galetovic, A. (2002). Competition in or for the Field: Which is Better? Yale University Cowles
Foundation Discussion Paper.
Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in Teams. Econometrica, 41, 617-631.
Hank, I., & McCarthy, T. (2000). Telecommunication Regulation Handbook. The World Bank.
Jamison, M. (2008). Regulation: Rate of Return. Encyclopedia of Energy Engineering and Technology, 1252-1257.
Laffont, J.-J. (1994). The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After. Econometrica, 11, 507-537.
Laffont, J.-J., & Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. In Cambridge, MA. MIT
Press.
Ramsey, F. (1927). A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal, 37, 47-61.
Robinson–Patman Act, No. 74-692 (United States Federal Law June 19, 1936).
Sappington, D. (1982). Optimal Regulation of Research and Development under Inperfect Information. Bell Journal
of Economics, 13.
Sappington, D. (1983). Optimal Regulation of Multiproduct Monpoly with Unknown Technological Capabilities. Bell
Journal of Economics, 14.
Shliefer, A. (1985). A Theory of Yardstick Competition. RAND Journal of Economics, 16, 319-317.
Simon, C. (2002). Price-Cap Regulation. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 9, 167-188.
Smyth v. Ames (The Supreme Court May 31, 1898).
Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. The Journal of Finance, 16,
-37.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
The Office of the NBTC holds the copyright of articles appearing in the journal. The Office of the NBTC allows the public or individuals to distribute, copy, or republish the work under a Creative Commons license (CC), with attribution (BY), No Derivatives (ND) and NonCommercial (NC); unless written permission is received from the Office of the NBTC.
Text, tables, and figures that appear in articles accepted for publication in this journal are personal opinion and responsibility of the author, and not binding on the NBTC and the Office of the NBTC. In case of errors, each author is solely responsible for their own article, and not concerning the NBTC and the NBTC Office in any way.
