ความอยุติธรรมเชิงญาณวิทยาของฟริกเกอร์: ข้อพิจารณาผ่านข้อวิพากษ์ของเจมส์ โบแมน และไซมอน เมย์ (Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Through the Critiques of James Bohman and Simon May)

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to criticize the argument of James Bohman towards Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice.  Bohman points out the important perspective that Fricker might overlook.  At the same time, there is some of Fricker’s perspective that Bohman overlooks.  The author believes that the combination of Bohman’s argument and Fricker’s proposal would practically strengthen the latter’s solution on Epistemic Injustice.  Therefore, I propose that Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice could be enhanced and strengthen by bringing in Bohman’s perspectives.