Market Expansion, Political Relationship and Geographical Inequality in the Early Rattanakosin Siam: A Theoretical Perspective
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14456/tresp.2016.4Keywords:
Geography, inequality, market structure, institutional development, ThailandAbstract
This paper provides a simple theoretical model that explains a mechanism for which market economy might proliferate through various geographical locations in the early Rattanakosin Siam and its implication on locational inequality. The proliferation of market economy is often facilitated by a widespread network of merchants and the elite’s profit-maximisation trade incentives. The degree of market expansion in each city depends on elite’s benefits from the market and geographical location of the city. The results suggest four factors that contribute to the level of inequality both within and between cities: social structure, geographical location, individual’s connection with powerful elites and worker’s ability.
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