A Proposal for Parliamentary Reform in Thailand: Toward a Qualified Unicameral System Through Comparative Analysis of International Experiences
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Abstract
This research article constitutes part of a comprehensive study entitled
“Proposals for Parliamentary Reform in Thailand: A Comparative Analytical Perspective,” which examines constitutional deficiencies and appropriate approaches for reforming Thailand’s legislative framework through doctrinal research methodology and comparative constitutional analysis with parliamentary systems in Norway, New Zealand, France, and Japan. The study identifies three critical constitutional problems: first, the lack of constitutional continuity in parliamentary development resulting from frequent unconstitutional interventions, which have led to legislative structures designed to preserve the interests of ruling elites rather than uphold the rule of law and democratic constitutionalism; second, the constitutional legitimacy crisis of the Senate under Article 107 of Thailand’s Constitution B.E. 2560 (2017), which mandates senatorial appointment
through selection rather than popular election, thereby breaching the principle of democratic representation and creating institutional conflicts with the popularly elected House of Representatives; and third, the complex electoral provisions that fail to ensure genuine popular sovereignty and electoral accountability. Consequently, this research proposes constitutional reform toward a Qualified Unicameralism system based on the Norwegian constitutional model, comprising 500 members elected entirely through direct popular suffrage under constitutional provisions, divided into 350 constituency-based representatives and 150 proportional representation list members. For constitutional amendments or consideration of significant legislation, the parliament would be constitutionally divided into a Consultative Assembly of 125 members with specialized legal expertise and a Main Assembly of 375 members. This reformed constitutional framework would eliminate inter-chamber conflicts, as all members derive their mandate from direct popular election under constitutional authority, ensuring equal constitutional legitimacy, enhance legislative efficiency by eliminating duplicative constitutional procedures, while maintaining constitutional safeguards through the Consultative Assembly for critical legislation, thereby achieving both constitutional efficiency and constitutional prudence in the legislative process.
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