Community Rights and Common-pool Resources-CPRs by Elinor Ostrom
Keywords:
Common-pool resources, Community rights, Community developmentAbstract
This academic article revisits a concept of Common-pool Resources-CPRs as Elinor Ostrom’s approach, The world's first female Nobel Prize-winning American economist who proposed the concept of Common-pool Resources management. The concept is to counter the mainstream discourse that denies community rights, which is comprised of eight components–these are (1) boundaries, (2) congruence, (3) collective choice arrangements, (4) monitoring, (5) graduated sanctions, (6) conflict resolution mechanism, (7) minimal recognition of rights, and (8) nested enterprises. It emphasizes community rights to manage their common recourses by government acceptance with decentralization as the concept of new local governance to promote people participation for sustainable community development.
References
Agrawal, A. (2003). Sustainable governance of common-pool resources: Context, methods, and politics. Annual Review Anthropology, 32, 243-262. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25064829
Andersson, K. P., & Ostrom, E. (2008). Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric Perspective. Policy Sciences, 41, 71-93. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-007-9055-6
Araral, E. (2014). Ostrom, Hardin and the commons: A critical appreciation and a revisionist view. Environmental Science & Policy, 36, 11-23. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2013.07.011
Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the Commons. Science, 162(3859). 1243-1248. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.162.3859.1243
Laerhoven, F. V., & Ostrom, E. (2007). Traditional and Trends in the study of the Commons, International Journal of the Commons, 1(1), 3-28. https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.76
Olson, M. (1965). Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1994). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioral approach to the rational choice theory of collective action: Presidential address, American political science association, 1997. American Political Science Review, 92(1), 1-22. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585925
Ostrom, E. (2010). Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems. American Economic Review. 100(3), 641-672. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.641
Poteete, A. R., Janssen, M. A., & Ostrom, E. (2009). Multiple methods in practice: Collective action and the commons. Princeton University Press. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/49956255_Working_Together_Collective_Action_The_Commons_and_Multiple_Methods_in_Practice_A_Poteete_MA_Janssen_E_Ostrom
Sarker, A., Ikeda, T., Abe, T., & Inoue, K. (2015). Design principles for managing coastal fisheries commons in present-day Japan. Ecological Economics, 117(3), 32-38. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECOLECON.2015.06.019
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2026 Journal of Social Work and Social Administration
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
The manuscripts published in the Social Work Journal is the copyright of the Social Work Journal, Thammasat University
Any article or opinion appeared in the Social Work Journal will solely be under the responsibility of the author The Faculty of Social Administration, Thammasat University and the editors do not need to reach in agreement or hold any responsibility.
