THE CYCLE OF POLITICAL CRISIS IN THAILAND OVER TWO DECADES: FROM PARLIAMENTARY DICTATORSHIP TO CAPITAL-AND-ELITE-CAPTURED DEMOCRACY (2001–2025)

Abstract

This academic article aims to critique and deconstruct the concept of “political mutation” or the “Scambodia Syndrome” discourse, which often explains the failure of Thai democracy as a biological pathology or a genetic abnormality. It proposes a legal-political analytical framework to explain the cycle of political conflict crises in Thailand over two decades (2001–2025) through the theories of “Competitive Authoritarianism” and “State Capture”. The findings indicate that the decline of Thai democracy is not a coincidence but the result of strategic interactions between majority political capital capturing state mechanisms and traditional elite networks responding with “Lawfare” tactics and military coups to maintain the balance of power. This cycle resulted in the phenomenon of an “Elite Settlement” following the 2023 general election, leading to the formation of a cross-bloc government to protect the interests of monopoly capital and block the participation of emerging social forces. Comparative studies of Peru, South Korea, and Malaysia confirm that these political crisis cycles can be resolved through institutional reforms based on international standards. Consequently, the study proposes a solution through “Legal Engineering” to establish a genuine “Rule of Law,” defined as a legal system where everyone is equally subject to the same rules, state power is constrained by legal principles, and the judiciary remains independent of political interference. Key recommendations include reforming the origins and structures of independent organizations to prevent cronyism, establishing regulations to prevent state capture by monopoly capital through trade competition law reform, and drafting a people’s constitution to serve as a new social contract for a sustainable democratic future.