Concept and Prototype Model of New Public Management of Social Security Fund: Quasi-Government Fund

Abstract

This article aims to analyze and propose a conceptual framework and prototype model for the management of a quasi-government fund through the integration of key theoretical perspectives, namely new public management, public choice theory, and the principles of good governance. These perspectives are employed as the foundation for explaining and developing an appropriate management model for a complex public fund, referred to as the “new stability prototype model for the Social Security Fund,” which emphasizes efficiency, transparency, and long-term sustainability. The proposed model comprises several essential components, including an independent governance structure insulated from political interference, proactive investment and financial management, a legal framework recognizing public juristic person status, transparent mechanisms for accountability and oversight, protection of insured persons’ security, the development of information technology systems to support administration, and tangible stakeholder participation. Analysis of financial data from 2015 to 2024 indicates the fund’s increasing fragility, as expenditures rose by 177 percent while revenues increased by only 38 percent. Compound growth projections further suggest that, in the absence of empirical structural reform, the fund may face severe liquidity constraints and eventual depletion by 2054. The study therefore concludes that transforming the Social Security Office into a highly flexible state-supervised agency with professional investment management, comparable to the Government Pension Fund, is essential for safeguarding the long-term welfare of Thai workers.