“GOOD” AND “BAD” PEOPLE IN THAI CULTURE: MORAL STRUCTURES AND THE DARK SIDES OF GOODNESS IN CONTEMPORARY THAI SOCIETY
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Abstract
This article reviews and synthesizes conceptual literature on the “good person–bad person” binary in Thai culture. It proposes that goodness should be understood as a moral structure embedded in everyday life, rather than being seen merely as an individual virtue detached from its social context. Drawing on moral anthropology and everyday ethics, the article explains (1) how meanings of goodness are constructed, (2) how goodness becomes a social norm, and (3) how such a moral framework is used to classify individuals as good or bad in contemporary Thai society. The synthesis shows that goodness does not function only as a moral ideal, but also as a mechanism that produces legitimacy and regulates social relationships through cultural expectations, shared ideals, and repeated practices in everyday life. At the same time, part of the literature reveals the darker side of goodness when it is elevated into a norm that is difficult to question, including moral superiority, moral violence, unintentional harm, and pressure placed on those expected to be good. The article argues that these phenomena do not arise only from individual ill intent, but are also related to a moral structure that treats goodness as the highest standard for judging persons. In this way, the article opens a deeper understanding of morality, conflict, and coexistence in contemporary Thai society.
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