REFERENDUM ON A NEW CONSTITUTION: REORDERING STATE POWER TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
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Abstract
This academic article aimed to: (1) analyze the 2026 constitutional referendum as a significant milestone in the reconfiguration of the power structure of the Thai state; (2) examine the underlying causes of fragility in previous Thai constitutions through the concepts of the hierarchy of legitimacy and institutional transition; and (3) propose a new model of power reconfiguration aligned with international standards. The study employed a systematic literature review and comparative analysis by integrating the concepts of the social contract, constituent power theory, and deliberative democracy. The findings revealed that the fragility of previous Thai constitutions had resulted from a misdirected, top-down hierarchy of legitimacy. Accordingly, the article proposed a new model of power reconfiguration through a process of “popular consensus,” incorporating an equilibrium equation between tradition and reform. This approach was intended to facilitate the transformation of the Thai state into a state grounded in principled authority and international standards, thereby leading to the drafting of a constitution that genuinely functioned as a social contract. The theoretical synthesis further led to the formulation of a “New State Power Architecture Model,” which comprised four key pillars: critical capacity, inclusive participation, the exercise of public reason, and safe spaces for dissent.
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